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a2a-source-edit: write agent.py

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a2a-cloud
2026-07-13 03:07:14 +00:00
parent 7e0dd78cd4
commit 2140614c2d
1 changed files with 236 additions and 420 deletions
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656
agent.py
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@@ -24,26 +24,23 @@ from a2a_pack import (
WorkspaceMode,
)
from a2a_pack.context import AgentEvent
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator, model_validator
from pydantic import BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator
APPROVAL_ACK = "I_APPROVE_THE_LISTED_STEPS"
OUTPUT_ROOT = "outputs/support-cases"
MAX_TEXT_CHARS = 24000
MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS = 80
MAX_PATHS = 40
class SupportToFixEngineerConfig(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
max_log_chars: int = Field(default=12000, ge=1000, le=50000)
default_dry_run: bool = True
MAX_TEXT = 24000
MAX_ITEMS = 80
class StrictModel(BaseModel):
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid", use_enum_values=True)
class SupportToFixEngineerConfig(StrictModel):
max_log_chars: int = Field(default=12000, ge=1000, le=50000)
default_dry_run: bool = True
class Severity(str, Enum):
sev1 = "sev1"
sev2 = "sev2"
@@ -70,6 +67,16 @@ class DeliveryAction(str, Enum):
customer_summary = "customer_summary"
class KeyValue(StrictModel):
key: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
value: str = Field(default="", max_length=1200)
@field_validator("key", "value")
@classmethod
def clean(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact(value.strip())[:1200]
class EvidenceItem(StrictModel):
source_id: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=160)
kind: EvidenceKind
@@ -80,17 +87,15 @@ class EvidenceItem(StrictModel):
@field_validator("source_id", "summary", "excerpt")
@classmethod
def _redact_text_fields(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
if value is None:
return None
return redact_secrets(value)[:4000]
def clean_text(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
return None if value is None else redact(value)[:4000]
@field_validator("url")
@classmethod
def _validate_url(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
if value in (None, ""):
def safe_url(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
if not value:
return None
return validate_safe_url(value, allowed_hosts=())
return validate_safe_url(value, allowed_hosts=set())
class HttpCheck(StrictModel):
@@ -106,13 +111,13 @@ class RepoFileChange(StrictModel):
@field_validator("path")
@classmethod
def _safe_path(cls, value: str) -> str:
return safe_repo_path(value)
def path_ok(cls, value: str) -> str:
return safe_path(value)
@field_validator("proposed_content")
@field_validator("reason", "proposed_content")
@classmethod
def _redact_content(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
return redact_secrets(value) if value is not None else None
def redact_text(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
return None if value is None else redact(value)
class TriageCaseInput(StrictModel):
@@ -120,58 +125,58 @@ class TriageCaseInput(StrictModel):
customer_id: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
tenant_id: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
release: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=120)
ticket_text: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=MAX_TEXT_CHARS)
evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS)
ticket_text: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=MAX_TEXT)
evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_ITEMS)
affected_services: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
recent_changes: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=40)
dry_run: bool = True
@field_validator("ticket_text")
@field_validator("ticket_text", "customer_id", "tenant_id", "release")
@classmethod
def _redact_ticket(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact_secrets(value)
def redact_fields(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact(value)
@field_validator("affected_services", "recent_changes")
@classmethod
def _bounded_strings(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return [redact_secrets(v.strip())[:500] for v in values if v.strip()]
def clean_list(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return [redact(v.strip())[:500] for v in values if v.strip()]
class ReproduceIssueInput(StrictModel):
case_id: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=80, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{2,79}$")
redacted_symptom: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=8000)
environment: dict[str, str] = Field(default_factory=dict, max_length=30)
environment: list[KeyValue] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=30)
observed_errors: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=40)
candidate_files: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_PATHS)
candidate_files: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=40)
health_checks: list[HttpCheck] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
allowed_health_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=30)
dry_run: bool = True
@field_validator("candidate_files")
@classmethod
def _safe_paths(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return [safe_repo_path(v) for v in values]
@field_validator("redacted_symptom")
@classmethod
def _redact_symptom(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact_secrets(value)
def redact_symptom(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact(value)
@field_validator("candidate_files")
@classmethod
def safe_paths(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
return [safe_path(v) for v in values]
class ProposeFixInput(StrictModel):
case_id: str = Field(min_length=3, max_length=80, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{2,79}$")
reproduction_summary: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=12000)
hypotheses: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
supporting_evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS)
contradicting_evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS)
proposed_changes: list[RepoFileChange] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_PATHS)
supporting_evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_ITEMS)
contradicting_evidence: list[EvidenceItem] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_ITEMS)
proposed_changes: list[RepoFileChange] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=40)
repository: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=200)
dry_run: bool = True
@field_validator("reproduction_summary")
@classmethod
def _redact_repro(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact_secrets(value)
def redact_summary(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact(value)
class ValidateFixInput(StrictModel):
@@ -185,21 +190,20 @@ class ValidateFixInput(StrictModel):
@field_validator("test_selectors", "lint_selectors", "security_checks")
@classmethod
def _selectors(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
cleaned: list[str] = []
for value in values:
item = value.strip()
if not item:
continue
if re.search(r"[;&|`$<>]", item):
raise ValueError("selectors must not contain shell metacharacters")
cleaned.append(item[:180])
return cleaned
def selector_ok(cls, values: list[str]) -> list[str]:
out: list[str] = []
for item in values:
cleaned = item.strip()
if cleaned:
if re.search(r"[;&|`$<>]", cleaned):
raise ValueError("selectors must not contain shell metacharacters")
out.append(cleaned[:180])
return out
@field_validator("patch_diff")
@classmethod
def _patch_without_secrets(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact_secrets(value)
def patch_clean(cls, value: str) -> str:
return redact(value)
class PrepareDeliveryInput(StrictModel):
@@ -217,7 +221,7 @@ class PrepareDeliveryInput(StrictModel):
@field_validator("repository", "target_branch", "proposed_branch")
@classmethod
def _safe_refish(cls, value: str) -> str:
def ref_ok(cls, value: str) -> str:
if re.search(r"[\s;&|`$<>]", value):
raise ValueError("repository and branch values must not contain whitespace or shell metacharacters")
return value
@@ -234,7 +238,20 @@ class AuditRecord(StrictModel):
event: str
at: str
case_id: str
details: dict[str, Any] = Field(default_factory=dict)
details: list[KeyValue] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
class HypothesisRank(StrictModel):
hypothesis: str
rank: int = Field(ge=1)
confidence: float = Field(ge=0.0, le=1.0)
supporting_source_ids: list[str]
contradicting_source_ids: list[str]
class CheckResult(StrictModel):
name: str
status: str
class TriageCaseOutput(StrictModel):
@@ -264,14 +281,6 @@ class ReproduceIssueOutput(StrictModel):
warnings: list[str]
class HypothesisRank(StrictModel):
hypothesis: str
rank: int = Field(ge=1)
confidence: float = Field(ge=0.0, le=1.0)
supporting_source_ids: list[str]
contradicting_source_ids: list[str]
class ProposeFixOutput(StrictModel):
status: str
case_id: str
@@ -290,7 +299,7 @@ class ValidateFixOutput(StrictModel):
case_id: str
validation_digest: str
patch_digest: str
checks: dict[str, str]
checks: list[CheckResult]
artifacts: list[ArtifactRecord]
audit: list[AuditRecord]
warnings: list[str]
@@ -311,20 +320,11 @@ class PrepareDeliveryOutput(StrictModel):
class SupportToFixEngineer(A2AAgent[SupportToFixEngineerConfig, NoAuth]):
name = "support-to-fix-engineer"
description = (
"Turns authenticated support cases into evidence-backed engineering fix artifacts "
"with deterministic triage, reproduction, patch proposal, validation, and approval-gated delivery."
)
description = "Turns support cases into evidence-backed fix artifacts with approval-gated delivery."
version = "0.1.0"
config_model = SupportToFixEngineerConfig
auth_model = NoAuth
pricing = Pricing(
price_per_call_usd=0.0,
caller_pays_llm=False,
notes="Deterministic policy and artifact generation; no LLM credential required.",
)
pricing = Pricing(price_per_call_usd=0.0, caller_pays_llm=False, notes="Deterministic policy and artifact generation; no LLM credential required.")
resources = Resources(cpu="1", memory="512Mi", max_runtime_seconds=600)
workspace_access = WorkspaceAccess.dynamic(
max_files=160,
@@ -337,288 +337,164 @@ class SupportToFixEngineer(A2AAgent[SupportToFixEngineerConfig, NoAuth]):
consumer_setup = ConsumerSetup.from_fields(
ConsumerSetupField.config("GITEA_BASE_URL", label="Gitea base URL", input_type="url", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.secret("GITEA_TOKEN", label="Gitea token", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("GITEA_ALLOWED_REPOS", label="Allowed repositories", required=False, description="Comma-separated owner/repo allowlist."),
ConsumerSetupField.config("GITEA_ALLOWED_REPOS", label="Allowed repositories", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("KUBERNETES_API_URL", label="Kubernetes API URL", input_type="url", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.secret("KUBERNETES_TOKEN", label="Kubernetes token", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("ARGOCD_BASE_URL", label="Argo CD base URL", input_type="url", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.secret("ARGOCD_TOKEN", label="Argo CD token", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("OBSERVABILITY_BASE_URL", label="Observability base URL", input_type="url", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.secret("OBSERVABILITY_TOKEN", label="Observability token", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("TENANT_ALLOWLIST", label="Tenant allowlist", required=False, description="Comma-separated tenant IDs this agent may process."),
ConsumerSetupField.config("HEALTHCHECK_ALLOWED_HOSTS", label="HTTP health check hosts", required=False, description="Comma-separated exact host allowlist."),
ConsumerSetupField.config("TENANT_ALLOWLIST", label="Tenant allowlist", required=False),
ConsumerSetupField.config("HEALTHCHECK_ALLOWED_HOSTS", label="HTTP health check hosts", required=False),
)
egress = EgressPolicy(allow_hosts=(), deny_internet_by_default=True)
tools_used = ("pydantic", "workspace")
@a2a.tool(description="Intake, redact, correlate evidence, classify severity and ownership for a bounded support case", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True)
async def triage_case(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], case: TriageCaseInput) -> TriageCaseOutput:
await emit_audit(ctx, case.case_id, "triage_started", {"dry_run": case.dry_run})
warnings = policy_warnings(case.ticket_text, [e.summary for e in case.evidence])
setup = missing_setup(ctx, include_tokens=False)
tenant_allowed = tenant_is_allowed(ctx, case.tenant_id)
await emit_audit(ctx, case.case_id, "triage_started", [kv("dry_run", case.dry_run)])
warnings = warnings_for(case.ticket_text, [e.summary for e in case.evidence])
allowed = tenant_allowed(ctx, case.tenant_id)
severity = classify_severity(case.ticket_text, case.evidence)
owner = classify_owner(case.affected_services, case.ticket_text, case.recent_changes)
evidence_index = normalized_evidence(case.evidence, case.ticket_text, case.release, case.recent_changes)
payload = {
"case_id": case.case_id,
"customer_id": redact_secrets(case.customer_id),
"tenant_id": redact_secrets(case.tenant_id),
"release": redact_secrets(case.release),
"severity": severity.value,
"owner": owner,
"allowed_tenant": tenant_allowed,
"evidence": [item.model_dump(mode="json") for item in evidence_index],
}
evidence = normalize_evidence(case)
payload = {"case_id": case.case_id, "customer_id": case.customer_id, "tenant_id": case.tenant_id, "release": case.release, "severity": severity.value, "owner": owner, "allowed_tenant": allowed, "evidence": [e.model_dump(mode="json") for e in evidence]}
digest = stable_digest(payload)
artifacts = [
await write_case_file(ctx, case.case_id, "redacted_case.json", json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True)),
await write_case_file(ctx, case.case_id, "triage.json", json.dumps({**payload, "plan_digest": digest}, indent=2, sort_keys=True)),
]
audit = [audit_record(case.case_id, "triage_completed", {"plan_digest": digest, "severity": severity.value})]
await emit_audit(ctx, case.case_id, "triage_completed", {"plan_digest": digest})
status = "triaged" if tenant_allowed else "blocked_ungranted_tenant"
artifacts = [await write_case_file(ctx, case.case_id, "redacted_case.json", dumps(payload)), await write_case_file(ctx, case.case_id, "triage.json", dumps({**payload, "plan_digest": digest}))]
audit = [audit_record(case.case_id, "triage_completed", [kv("plan_digest", digest), kv("severity", severity.value)])]
await emit_audit(ctx, case.case_id, "triage_completed", [kv("plan_digest", digest)])
setup = missing_setup(ctx)
if setup:
warnings.append("Some integrations are not configured; analysis used caller-supplied evidence only.")
return TriageCaseOutput(
status=status,
case_id=case.case_id,
severity=severity,
owner=owner,
redaction_count=count_redactions(case.ticket_text),
missing_setup=setup,
allowed_tenant=tenant_allowed,
plan_digest=digest,
evidence_index=evidence_index,
artifacts=artifacts,
audit=audit,
warnings=warnings,
)
return TriageCaseOutput(status="triaged" if allowed else "blocked_ungranted_tenant", case_id=case.case_id, severity=severity, owner=owner, redaction_count=count_redactions(case.ticket_text), missing_setup=setup, allowed_tenant=allowed, plan_digest=digest, evidence_index=evidence, artifacts=artifacts, audit=audit, warnings=warnings)
@a2a.tool(description="Create a deterministic minimal reproduction and validate HTTP health-check targets against SSRF protections", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True)
async def reproduce_issue(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], reproduction: ReproduceIssueInput) -> ReproduceIssueOutput:
await emit_audit(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_started", {"dry_run": reproduction.dry_run})
await emit_audit(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_started", [kv("dry_run", reproduction.dry_run)])
allowed_hosts = set(reproduction.allowed_health_hosts or split_csv(ctx.consumer_config("HEALTHCHECK_ALLOWED_HOSTS", "")))
safe_checks: list[HttpCheck] = []
safe: list[HttpCheck] = []
blocked: list[str] = []
for check in reproduction.health_checks:
try:
validate_safe_url(check.url, allowed_hosts=allowed_hosts)
safe_checks.append(check)
safe.append(check)
except ValueError as exc:
blocked.append(f"{check.name}: {exc}")
steps = build_reproduction_steps(reproduction)
doc = reproduction_markdown(reproduction, steps, safe_checks, blocked)
digest = stable_digest({"steps": steps, "safe_checks": [c.model_dump(mode="json") for c in safe_checks], "blocked": blocked})
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction.md", doc)
audit = [audit_record(reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_completed", {"reproduction_digest": digest})]
await emit_audit(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_completed", {"reproduction_digest": digest})
return ReproduceIssueOutput(
status="reproduced_deterministically",
case_id=reproduction.case_id,
reproduction_digest=digest,
minimal_steps=steps,
safe_health_checks=safe_checks,
blocked_health_checks=blocked,
artifacts=[artifact],
audit=audit,
warnings=policy_warnings(reproduction.redacted_symptom, reproduction.observed_errors),
)
steps = repro_steps(reproduction)
digest = stable_digest({"steps": steps, "safe": [c.model_dump(mode="json") for c in safe], "blocked": blocked})
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction.md", repro_markdown(reproduction, steps, safe, blocked))
audit = [audit_record(reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_completed", [kv("reproduction_digest", digest)])]
await emit_audit(ctx, reproduction.case_id, "reproduction_completed", [kv("reproduction_digest", digest)])
return ReproduceIssueOutput(status="reproduced_deterministically", case_id=reproduction.case_id, reproduction_digest=digest, minimal_steps=steps, safe_health_checks=safe, blocked_health_checks=blocked, artifacts=[artifact], audit=audit, warnings=warnings_for(reproduction.redacted_symptom, reproduction.observed_errors))
@a2a.tool(description="Rank hypotheses with provenance and produce a scoped patch.diff without modifying a repository", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True)
async def propose_fix(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], proposal: ProposeFixInput) -> ProposeFixOutput:
await emit_audit(ctx, proposal.case_id, "proposal_started", {"dry_run": proposal.dry_run})
warnings = policy_warnings(proposal.reproduction_summary, proposal.hypotheses)
scoped_paths = [change.path for change in proposal.proposed_changes]
await emit_audit(ctx, proposal.case_id, "proposal_started", [kv("dry_run", proposal.dry_run)])
ranked = rank_hypotheses(proposal.hypotheses, proposal.supporting_evidence, proposal.contradicting_evidence)
patch_diff = build_patch_diff(proposal.proposed_changes)
diagnosis = {
"case_id": proposal.case_id,
"repository": proposal.repository,
"hypotheses": [item.model_dump(mode="json") for item in ranked],
"scoped_paths": scoped_paths,
"dry_run": proposal.dry_run,
"note": "No repository mutation performed. Patch is an output artifact only.",
}
patch_digest = stable_digest({"patch_diff": patch_diff, "scoped_paths": scoped_paths})
plan_digest = stable_digest({"case_id": proposal.case_id, "repository": proposal.repository, "patch_digest": patch_digest, "paths": scoped_paths})
artifacts = [
await write_case_file(ctx, proposal.case_id, "diagnosis.json", json.dumps(diagnosis, indent=2, sort_keys=True)),
await write_case_file(ctx, proposal.case_id, "patch.diff", patch_diff),
]
audit = [audit_record(proposal.case_id, "proposal_completed", {"patch_digest": patch_digest, "plan_digest": plan_digest})]
await emit_audit(ctx, proposal.case_id, "proposal_completed", {"patch_digest": patch_digest})
return ProposeFixOutput(
status="patch_proposed_no_repository_write",
case_id=proposal.case_id,
repository=proposal.repository,
patch_digest=patch_digest,
plan_digest=plan_digest,
hypotheses=ranked,
scoped_paths=scoped_paths,
artifacts=artifacts,
audit=audit,
warnings=warnings,
)
paths = [c.path for c in proposal.proposed_changes]
patch = patch_diff(proposal.proposed_changes)
patch_digest = stable_digest({"patch_diff": patch, "paths": paths})
plan_digest = stable_digest({"case_id": proposal.case_id, "repository": proposal.repository, "patch_digest": patch_digest, "paths": paths})
diagnosis = {"case_id": proposal.case_id, "repository": proposal.repository, "hypotheses": [h.model_dump(mode="json") for h in ranked], "scoped_paths": paths, "dry_run": proposal.dry_run, "note": "No repository mutation performed. Patch is an output artifact only."}
artifacts = [await write_case_file(ctx, proposal.case_id, "diagnosis.json", dumps(diagnosis)), await write_case_file(ctx, proposal.case_id, "patch.diff", patch)]
audit = [audit_record(proposal.case_id, "proposal_completed", [kv("patch_digest", patch_digest), kv("plan_digest", plan_digest)])]
await emit_audit(ctx, proposal.case_id, "proposal_completed", [kv("patch_digest", patch_digest)])
return ProposeFixOutput(status="patch_proposed_no_repository_write", case_id=proposal.case_id, repository=proposal.repository, patch_digest=patch_digest, plan_digest=plan_digest, hypotheses=ranked, scoped_paths=paths, artifacts=artifacts, audit=audit, warnings=warnings_for(proposal.reproduction_summary, proposal.hypotheses))
@a2a.tool(description="Validate a proposed patch with deterministic static checks and test-plan selectors without executing arbitrary shell", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True)
async def validate_fix(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], validation: ValidateFixInput) -> ValidateFixOutput:
await emit_audit(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation_started", {"dry_run": validation.dry_run})
checks = deterministic_validation(validation)
warnings = [] if all(v == "pass" for v in checks.values()) else ["One or more deterministic checks require human review."]
payload = {
"case_id": validation.case_id,
"patch_digest": validation.patch_digest,
"checks": checks,
"test_selectors": validation.test_selectors,
"lint_selectors": validation.lint_selectors,
"security_checks": validation.security_checks,
"dry_run": validation.dry_run,
"note": "No arbitrary shell was executed; selectors are a reviewable validation plan.",
}
validation_digest = stable_digest(payload)
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation.json", json.dumps({**payload, "validation_digest": validation_digest}, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
audit = [audit_record(validation.case_id, "validation_completed", {"validation_digest": validation_digest})]
await emit_audit(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation_completed", {"validation_digest": validation_digest})
return ValidateFixOutput(
status="validated_dry_run" if validation.dry_run else "validated_without_deploy",
case_id=validation.case_id,
validation_digest=validation_digest,
patch_digest=validation.patch_digest,
checks=checks,
artifacts=[artifact],
audit=audit,
warnings=warnings,
)
await emit_audit(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation_started", [kv("dry_run", validation.dry_run)])
checks = validation_checks(validation)
payload = {"case_id": validation.case_id, "patch_digest": validation.patch_digest, "checks": [c.model_dump(mode="json") for c in checks], "test_selectors": validation.test_selectors, "lint_selectors": validation.lint_selectors, "security_checks": validation.security_checks, "dry_run": validation.dry_run, "note": "No arbitrary shell was executed; selectors are a reviewable validation plan."}
digest = stable_digest(payload)
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation.json", dumps({**payload, "validation_digest": digest}))
audit = [audit_record(validation.case_id, "validation_completed", [kv("validation_digest", digest)])]
await emit_audit(ctx, validation.case_id, "validation_completed", [kv("validation_digest", digest)])
warnings = [] if all(c.status == "pass" for c in checks) else ["One or more deterministic checks require human review."]
return ValidateFixOutput(status="validated_dry_run" if validation.dry_run else "validated_without_deploy", case_id=validation.case_id, validation_digest=digest, patch_digest=validation.patch_digest, checks=checks, artifacts=[artifact], audit=audit, warnings=warnings)
@a2a.tool(description="Prepare a reviewable branch/commit/PR draft and customer-safe summary; gated actions require approval bound to the plan digest", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True)
async def prepare_delivery(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], delivery: PrepareDeliveryInput) -> PrepareDeliveryOutput:
await emit_audit(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery_started", {"dry_run": delivery.dry_run})
actions = [str(action.value if isinstance(action, DeliveryAction) else action) for action in delivery.delivery_actions]
immutable_plan = {
"case_id": delivery.case_id,
"repository": delivery.repository,
"target_branch": delivery.target_branch,
"proposed_branch": delivery.proposed_branch,
"patch_digest": delivery.patch_digest,
"validation_digest": delivery.validation_digest,
"actions": actions,
}
plan_digest = stable_digest(immutable_plan)
consequential = any(action in {DeliveryAction.draft_branch.value, DeliveryAction.draft_commit.value, DeliveryAction.draft_pr.value} for action in actions)
approved = bool(
consequential
and not delivery.dry_run
and delivery.approval_acknowledgement == APPROVAL_ACK
and delivery.approval_plan_digest == plan_digest
)
approval_required = consequential and (delivery.dry_run or not approved)
executed_actions = actions if approved else ([DeliveryAction.customer_summary.value] if DeliveryAction.customer_summary.value in actions else [])
blocked_actions = [action for action in actions if action not in executed_actions]
doc = delivery_markdown(delivery, plan_digest, approval_required, approved, executed_actions, blocked_actions)
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery.md", doc)
audit = [audit_record(delivery.case_id, "delivery_prepared", {"plan_digest": plan_digest, "approved": approved})]
await emit_audit(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery_prepared", {"plan_digest": plan_digest, "approved": approved})
warnings = [
"No merge or deployment was performed.",
"Repository mutations are represented as a reviewable delivery plan only unless platform approval executes them outside this agent.",
]
return PrepareDeliveryOutput(
status="approval_required" if approval_required else "delivery_prepared",
case_id=delivery.case_id,
plan_digest=plan_digest,
approval_required=approval_required,
approved=approved,
executed_actions=executed_actions,
blocked_actions=blocked_actions,
artifacts=[artifact],
audit=audit,
warnings=warnings,
)
await emit_audit(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery_started", [kv("dry_run", delivery.dry_run)])
actions = [str(a.value if isinstance(a, DeliveryAction) else a) for a in delivery.delivery_actions]
plan = {"case_id": delivery.case_id, "repository": delivery.repository, "target_branch": delivery.target_branch, "proposed_branch": delivery.proposed_branch, "patch_digest": delivery.patch_digest, "validation_digest": delivery.validation_digest, "actions": actions}
digest = stable_digest(plan)
consequential = any(a in {"draft_branch", "draft_commit", "draft_pr"} for a in actions)
approved = consequential and not delivery.dry_run and delivery.approval_acknowledgement == APPROVAL_ACK and delivery.approval_plan_digest == digest
approval_required = consequential and not approved
executed = actions if approved else (["customer_summary"] if "customer_summary" in actions else [])
blocked = [a for a in actions if a not in executed]
artifact = await write_case_file(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery.md", delivery_doc(delivery, digest, approval_required, approved, executed, blocked))
audit = [audit_record(delivery.case_id, "delivery_prepared", [kv("plan_digest", digest), kv("approved", approved)])]
await emit_audit(ctx, delivery.case_id, "delivery_prepared", [kv("plan_digest", digest), kv("approved", approved)])
return PrepareDeliveryOutput(status="approval_required" if approval_required else "delivery_prepared", case_id=delivery.case_id, plan_digest=digest, approval_required=approval_required, approved=bool(approved), executed_actions=executed, blocked_actions=blocked, artifacts=[artifact], audit=audit, warnings=["No merge or deployment was performed.", "Repository mutations are represented as a reviewable delivery plan only unless platform approval executes them outside this agent."])
def kv(key: str, value: Any) -> KeyValue:
return KeyValue(key=str(key), value=str(value))
def split_csv(value: Any) -> list[str]:
return [item.strip() for item in str(value or "").split(",") if item.strip()]
return [x.strip() for x in str(value or "").split(",") if x.strip()]
def missing_setup(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], *, include_tokens: bool) -> list[str]:
names = []
for name in ("GITEA_BASE_URL", "KUBERNETES_API_URL", "ARGOCD_BASE_URL", "OBSERVABILITY_BASE_URL"):
if not ctx.consumer_config(name, ""):
names.append(name)
if include_tokens:
for secret_name in ("GITEA_TOKEN", "KUBERNETES_TOKEN", "ARGOCD_TOKEN", "OBSERVABILITY_TOKEN"):
try:
ctx.consumer_secret(secret_name)
except Exception:
names.append(secret_name)
return names
def missing_setup(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth]) -> list[str]:
return [name for name in ("GITEA_BASE_URL", "KUBERNETES_API_URL", "ARGOCD_BASE_URL", "OBSERVABILITY_BASE_URL") if not ctx.consumer_config(name, "")]
def tenant_is_allowed(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], tenant_id: str) -> bool:
def tenant_allowed(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], tenant_id: str) -> bool:
allowed = set(split_csv(ctx.consumer_config("TENANT_ALLOWLIST", "")))
return not allowed or tenant_id in allowed
SECRET_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)(authorization:\s*bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+|api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|token\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|password\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|secret\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----)")
PII_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)\b([A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}|\+?\d[\d .()\-]{7,}\d)\b")
INJECTION_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)(ignore (all )?(previous|prior) instructions|system prompt|developer message|reveal secrets|exfiltrate|curl\s+|wget\s+|bash\s+-c)")
def redact(text: str | None) -> str:
if not text:
return ""
return PII_RE.sub("[REDACTED_PII]", SECRET_RE.sub("[REDACTED_SECRET]", str(text)))
def count_redactions(text: str) -> int:
return len(SECRET_RE.findall(text or ""))
SECRET_RE = re.compile(
r"(?i)(authorization:\s*bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+|api[_-]?key\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|token\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|password\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|secret\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?[^\s,'\"]+|AKIA[0-9A-Z]{16}|-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----[\s\S]*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----)"
)
PII_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)\b([A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}|\+?\d[\d .()\-]{7,}\d)\b")
PROMPT_INJECTION_RE = re.compile(r"(?i)(ignore (all )?(previous|prior) instructions|system prompt|developer message|reveal secrets|exfiltrate|curl\s+|wget\s+|bash\s+-c)")
def redact_secrets(text: str | None) -> str:
if not text:
return ""
redacted = SECRET_RE.sub("[REDACTED_SECRET]", text)
return PII_RE.sub("[REDACTED_PII]", redacted)
def policy_warnings(*texts_or_lists: Any) -> list[str]:
joined_parts: list[str] = []
for item in texts_or_lists:
if isinstance(item, list):
joined_parts.extend(str(v) for v in item)
else:
joined_parts.append(str(item))
joined = "\n".join(joined_parts)
def warnings_for(*items: Any) -> list[str]:
flat: list[str] = []
for item in items:
flat.extend(str(v) for v in item) if isinstance(item, list) else flat.append(str(item))
text = "\n".join(flat)
warnings: list[str] = []
if PROMPT_INJECTION_RE.search(joined):
if INJECTION_RE.search(text):
warnings.append("Untrusted ticket/log content contained instruction-like text and was treated only as evidence.")
if SECRET_RE.search(joined):
if SECRET_RE.search(text):
warnings.append("Secrets were detected and redacted before artifact generation.")
if len(joined) > MAX_TEXT_CHARS:
if len(text) > MAX_TEXT:
warnings.append("Input was bounded and truncated for deterministic processing.")
return warnings
def safe_repo_path(path: str) -> str:
def safe_path(path: str) -> str:
clean = str(path).replace("\\", "/").strip().lstrip("/")
posix = PurePosixPath(clean)
if not clean or ".." in posix.parts or clean.startswith("~"):
if not clean or ".." in posix.parts or clean.startswith("~") or any(p in {".git", ".hg", ".svn"} for p in posix.parts):
raise ValueError(f"unsafe repository path: {path!r}")
if any(part in {".git", ".hg", ".svn"} for part in posix.parts):
raise ValueError("repository metadata paths are not allowed")
if len(posix.parts) > 20:
raise ValueError("repository path is too deep")
return posix.as_posix()
def safe_case_id(case_id: str) -> str:
def safe_case(case_id: str) -> str:
if not re.fullmatch(r"[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9._-]{2,79}", case_id):
raise ValueError("invalid case_id")
return case_id
def validate_safe_url(url: str, *, allowed_hosts: set[str] | tuple[str, ...]) -> str:
def validate_safe_url(url: str, *, allowed_hosts: set[str]) -> str:
parsed = urlparse(url)
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
raise ValueError("URL scheme must be http or https")
if not parsed.hostname:
raise ValueError("URL must include a hostname")
if parsed.scheme not in {"http", "https"} or not parsed.hostname:
raise ValueError("URL must be absolute http(s)")
host = parsed.hostname.lower().rstrip(".")
if allowed_hosts and host not in {h.lower().rstrip(".") for h in allowed_hosts}:
raise ValueError(f"host {host!r} is not in the allowlist")
@@ -629,200 +505,140 @@ def validate_safe_url(url: str, *, allowed_hosts: set[str] | tuple[str, ...]) ->
except ValueError:
ip = None
if ip and (ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_unspecified):
raise ValueError("private, loopback, link-local, multicast, reserved, and unspecified IPs are blocked")
raise ValueError("unsafe IP address is blocked")
if parsed.username or parsed.password:
raise ValueError("credentials in URLs are not allowed")
return url
def stable_digest(payload: Any) -> str:
encoded = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str).encode("utf-8")
return hashlib.sha256(encoded).hexdigest()
return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"), default=str).encode()).hexdigest()
def classify_severity(ticket_text: str, evidence: list[EvidenceItem]) -> Severity:
text = (ticket_text + "\n" + "\n".join(e.summary for e in evidence)).lower()
if any(term in text for term in ("outage", "data loss", "security incident", "all customers", "sev1")):
def classify_severity(ticket: str, evidence: list[EvidenceItem]) -> Severity:
text = (ticket + "\n" + "\n".join(e.summary for e in evidence)).lower()
if any(x in text for x in ("outage", "data loss", "security incident", "all customers", "sev1")):
return Severity.sev1
if any(term in text for term in ("unable", "down", "500", "payments failing", "sev2")):
if any(x in text for x in ("unable", "down", "500", "payments failing", "sev2")):
return Severity.sev2
if any(term in text for term in ("degraded", "intermittent", "slow", "error")):
if any(x in text for x in ("degraded", "intermittent", "slow", "error")):
return Severity.sev3
return Severity.sev4
def classify_owner(services: list[str], ticket_text: str, changes: list[str]) -> str:
haystack = " ".join([ticket_text, *services, *changes]).lower()
if "payment" in haystack or "checkout" in haystack:
def classify_owner(services: list[str], ticket: str, changes: list[str]) -> str:
text = " ".join([ticket, *services, *changes]).lower()
if "payment" in text or "checkout" in text:
return "payments"
if "auth" in haystack or "login" in haystack:
if "auth" in text or "login" in text:
return "identity"
if "kubernetes" in haystack or "pod" in haystack or "argocd" in haystack:
if "kubernetes" in text or "pod" in text or "argocd" in text:
return "platform"
if services:
return services[0][:80]
return "unassigned"
return services[0][:80] if services else "unassigned"
def normalized_evidence(evidence: list[EvidenceItem], ticket_text: str, release: str, changes: list[str]) -> list[EvidenceItem]:
out = list(evidence)
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id="ticket", kind=EvidenceKind.ticket, summary=redact_secrets(ticket_text[:1200]), excerpt=redact_secrets(ticket_text[:2000])))
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id="release", kind=EvidenceKind.release, summary=f"Release: {redact_secrets(release)}"))
for idx, change in enumerate(changes[:20], start=1):
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id=f"recent-change-{idx}", kind=EvidenceKind.change, summary=change[:1200]))
return out[:MAX_EVIDENCE_ITEMS]
def normalize_evidence(case: TriageCaseInput) -> list[EvidenceItem]:
out = list(case.evidence)
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id="ticket", kind=EvidenceKind.ticket, summary=case.ticket_text[:1200], excerpt=case.ticket_text[:2000]))
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id="release", kind=EvidenceKind.release, summary=f"Release: {case.release}"))
for i, change in enumerate(case.recent_changes[:20], 1):
out.append(EvidenceItem(source_id=f"recent-change-{i}", kind=EvidenceKind.change, summary=change[:1200]))
return out[:MAX_ITEMS]
def build_reproduction_steps(inp: ReproduceIssueInput) -> list[str]:
steps = [
"Use only the redacted support case and explicitly granted repository/workspace evidence.",
f"Set environment facets: {json.dumps({k: redact_secrets(v) for k, v in sorted(inp.environment.items())}, sort_keys=True)}.",
"Trigger the smallest customer-safe path that matches the observed symptom.",
]
def repro_steps(inp: ReproduceIssueInput) -> list[str]:
env = {item.key: item.value for item in inp.environment}
steps = ["Use only redacted case data and explicitly granted workspace evidence.", f"Set environment facets: {json.dumps(env, sort_keys=True)}.", "Trigger the smallest customer-safe path matching the symptom."]
if inp.observed_errors:
steps.append(f"Assert the observed error signature appears: {redact_secrets(inp.observed_errors[0])[:500]}.")
steps.append(f"Assert observed signature: {redact(inp.observed_errors[0])[:500]}.")
if inp.candidate_files:
steps.append("Inspect only scoped candidate files: " + ", ".join(inp.candidate_files[:10]) + ".")
if inp.health_checks:
steps.append("Run configured HTTP health checks only after SSRF allowlist validation; do not follow redirects.")
steps.append("Record expected vs actual behavior without customer secrets or raw tenant data.")
steps.append("Run configured HTTP checks only after SSRF allowlist validation; do not follow redirects.")
steps.append("Record expected versus actual behavior without customer secrets or raw tenant data.")
return steps
def reproduction_markdown(inp: ReproduceIssueInput, steps: list[str], checks: list[HttpCheck], blocked: list[str]) -> str:
lines = [
f"# Minimal Reproduction for {inp.case_id}",
"",
"## Symptom",
redact_secrets(inp.redacted_symptom),
"",
"## Deterministic Steps",
]
lines.extend(f"{idx}. {step}" for idx, step in enumerate(steps, start=1))
lines.extend(["", "## Safe Health Checks"])
if checks:
lines.extend(f"- {c.name}: {c.url} expects {c.expected_status}" for c in checks)
else:
lines.append("- None")
lines.extend(["", "## Blocked Health Checks"])
lines.extend([f"- {item}" for item in blocked] or ["- None"])
lines.extend(["", "## Safety", "Ticket and log instructions are untrusted evidence; no arbitrary shell or URL fetching is performed."])
return "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
def repro_markdown(inp: ReproduceIssueInput, steps: list[str], checks: list[HttpCheck], blocked: list[str]) -> str:
body = [f"# Minimal Reproduction for {inp.case_id}", "", "## Symptom", inp.redacted_symptom, "", "## Deterministic Steps"]
body += [f"{i}. {s}" for i, s in enumerate(steps, 1)]
body += ["", "## Safe Health Checks"] + ([f"- {c.name}: {c.url} expects {c.expected_status}" for c in checks] or ["- None"])
body += ["", "## Blocked Health Checks"] + ([f"- {b}" for b in blocked] or ["- None"])
body += ["", "## Safety", "Ticket/log instructions are untrusted evidence; no arbitrary shell or URL fetching is performed."]
return "\n".join(body) + "\n"
def rank_hypotheses(hypotheses: list[str], supporting: list[EvidenceItem], contradicting: list[EvidenceItem]) -> list[HypothesisRank]:
if not hypotheses:
hypotheses = ["Regression correlated with recent release/change and observed error signature"]
ranked: list[HypothesisRank] = []
support_ids = [e.source_id for e in supporting]
contra_ids = [e.source_id for e in contradicting]
for idx, hypothesis in enumerate(hypotheses[:20], start=1):
confidence = max(0.1, min(0.95, 0.55 + (len(support_ids) * 0.05) - (len(contra_ids) * 0.08) - ((idx - 1) * 0.03)))
ranked.append(HypothesisRank(hypothesis=redact_secrets(hypothesis)[:1000], rank=idx, confidence=round(confidence, 2), supporting_source_ids=support_ids[:20], contradicting_source_ids=contra_ids[:20]))
return ranked
raw = hypotheses or ["Regression correlated with recent release/change and observed error signature"]
sids = [e.source_id for e in supporting]
cids = [e.source_id for e in contradicting]
return [HypothesisRank(hypothesis=redact(h)[:1000], rank=i, confidence=round(max(0.1, min(0.95, 0.55 + len(sids) * 0.05 - len(cids) * 0.08 - (i - 1) * 0.03)), 2), supporting_source_ids=sids[:20], contradicting_source_ids=cids[:20]) for i, h in enumerate(raw[:20], 1)]
def build_patch_diff(changes: list[RepoFileChange]) -> str:
def patch_diff(changes: list[RepoFileChange]) -> str:
if not changes:
return "diff --git a/README.md b/README.md\n--- a/README.md\n+++ b/README.md\n@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@\n+# Support Case Fix Placeholder\n+No scoped code changes were supplied.\n+Attach repository evidence before implementation.\n"
parts: list[str] = []
for change in changes:
content = change.proposed_content or f"# Proposed change\n# Reason: {change.reason}\n"
safe_content = redact_secrets(content).splitlines()
parts.append(f"diff --git a/{change.path} b/{change.path}")
parts.append(f"--- a/{change.path}")
parts.append(f"+++ b/{change.path}")
parts.append("@@ -0,0 +1,%d @@" % max(1, len(safe_content)))
parts.extend("+" + line for line in safe_content[:400])
lines = redact(change.proposed_content or f"# Proposed change\n# Reason: {change.reason}\n").splitlines()
parts += [f"diff --git a/{change.path} b/{change.path}", f"--- a/{change.path}", f"+++ b/{change.path}", f"@@ -0,0 +1,{max(1, len(lines))} @@"]
parts += ["+" + line for line in lines[:400]]
return "\n".join(parts) + "\n"
def deterministic_validation(inp: ValidateFixInput) -> dict[str, str]:
checks: dict[str, str] = {}
checks["patch_digest_format"] = "pass" if re.fullmatch(r"[a-fA-F0-9]{16,128}", inp.patch_digest) else "review"
checks["patch_has_diff_header"] = "pass" if "diff --git" in inp.patch_diff and "+++ b/" in inp.patch_diff else "review"
checks["no_secret_literals"] = "pass" if not SECRET_RE.search(inp.patch_diff) else "fail"
checks["path_containment"] = "pass" if not re.search(r"(^|\n)(---|\+\+\+) [ab]/(\.\.|/|.*\.git)", inp.patch_diff) else "fail"
checks["test_plan_present"] = "pass" if inp.test_selectors else "review"
checks["lint_plan_present"] = "pass" if inp.lint_selectors else "review"
checks["security_plan_present"] = "pass" if inp.security_checks else "review"
checks["dry_run_enforced"] = "pass" if inp.dry_run else "review"
return checks
def validation_checks(inp: ValidateFixInput) -> list[CheckResult]:
values = {
"patch_digest_format": "pass" if re.fullmatch(r"[a-fA-F0-9]{16,128}", inp.patch_digest) else "review",
"patch_has_diff_header": "pass" if "diff --git" in inp.patch_diff and "+++ b/" in inp.patch_diff else "review",
"no_secret_literals": "pass" if not SECRET_RE.search(inp.patch_diff) else "fail",
"path_containment": "pass" if not re.search(r"(^|\n)(---|\+\+\+) [ab]/(\.\.|/|.*\.git)", inp.patch_diff) else "fail",
"test_plan_present": "pass" if inp.test_selectors else "review",
"lint_plan_present": "pass" if inp.lint_selectors else "review",
"security_plan_present": "pass" if inp.security_checks else "review",
"dry_run_enforced": "pass" if inp.dry_run else "review",
}
return [CheckResult(name=k, status=v) for k, v in values.items()]
def delivery_markdown(inp: PrepareDeliveryInput, plan_digest: str, approval_required: bool, approved: bool, executed: list[str], blocked: list[str]) -> str:
safe_summary = redact_secrets(inp.customer_summary_context)[:2000]
return "\n".join([
f"# Delivery Plan for {inp.case_id}",
"",
f"Plan digest: `{plan_digest}`",
f"Repository: `{inp.repository}`",
f"Target branch: `{inp.target_branch}`",
f"Proposed branch: `{inp.proposed_branch}`",
f"Patch digest: `{inp.patch_digest}`",
f"Validation digest: `{inp.validation_digest}`",
"",
"## Approval",
f"Approval required: `{str(approval_required).lower()}`",
f"Approved: `{str(approved).lower()}`",
f"Required acknowledgement: `{APPROVAL_ACK}` bound to the plan digest above.",
"",
"## Actions",
"Executed/prepared: " + (", ".join(executed) if executed else "none"),
"Blocked: " + (", ".join(blocked) if blocked else "none"),
"",
"## Customer-safe Resolution Summary",
safe_summary or "A scoped fix has been prepared for engineering review. No customer secrets, raw logs, or deployment details are included.",
"",
"## Non-actions",
"This agent never merges, deploys, follows ticket/log instructions, executes arbitrary shell, or fetches arbitrary URLs.",
]) + "\n"
def delivery_doc(inp: PrepareDeliveryInput, digest: str, required: bool, approved: bool, executed: list[str], blocked: list[str]) -> str:
summary = redact(inp.customer_summary_context)[:2000] or "A scoped fix has been prepared for engineering review. No customer secrets, raw logs, or deployment details are included."
return "\n".join([f"# Delivery Plan for {inp.case_id}", "", f"Plan digest: `{digest}`", f"Repository: `{inp.repository}`", f"Target branch: `{inp.target_branch}`", f"Proposed branch: `{inp.proposed_branch}`", f"Patch digest: `{inp.patch_digest}`", f"Validation digest: `{inp.validation_digest}`", "", "## Approval", f"Approval required: `{str(required).lower()}`", f"Approved: `{str(approved).lower()}`", f"Required acknowledgement: `{APPROVAL_ACK}` bound to the plan digest above.", "", "## Actions", "Executed/prepared: " + (", ".join(executed) if executed else "none"), "Blocked: " + (", ".join(blocked) if blocked else "none"), "", "## Customer-safe Resolution Summary", summary, "", "## Non-actions", "This agent never merges, deploys, follows ticket/log instructions, executes arbitrary shell, or fetches arbitrary URLs."]) + "\n"
def audit_record(case_id: str, event: str, details: dict[str, Any]) -> AuditRecord:
return AuditRecord(event=event, at=datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), case_id=case_id, details=json_sanitize(details))
def audit_record(case_id: str, event: str, details: list[KeyValue]) -> AuditRecord:
return AuditRecord(event=event, at=datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(), case_id=case_id, details=details)
async def emit_audit(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], case_id: str, event: str, details: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
async def emit_audit(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], case_id: str, event: str, details: list[KeyValue]) -> None:
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind="audit", payload=audit_record(case_id, event, details).model_dump(mode="json")))
def json_sanitize(value: Any) -> Any:
raw = json.dumps(value, default=str)
return json.loads(redact_secrets(raw))
def dumps(value: Any) -> str:
return redact(json.dumps(value, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str))
async def write_case_file(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], case_id: str, filename: str, content: str) -> ArtifactRecord:
safe_case = safe_case_id(case_id)
safe_name = safe_repo_path(filename)
if "/" in safe_name:
raise ValueError("case artifact filename must not contain subdirectories")
rel_path = f"{OUTPUT_ROOT}/{safe_case}/{safe_name}"
data = redact_secrets(content).encode("utf-8")
rel_path = f"{OUTPUT_ROOT}/{safe_case(case_id)}/{safe_path(filename)}"
if safe_path(filename) != filename:
raise ValueError("artifact filename must be a plain relative filename")
data = redact(content).encode()
digest = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()
artifact_uri: str | None = None
try:
view = await ctx.workspace.open_view(
purpose=f"Persist support case artifact {safe_name}",
hints=[safe_case, safe_name],
file_types=(),
max_files=1,
mode=WorkspaceMode.READ_WRITE_OVERLAY,
reason="Persist generated support-to-fix engineering artifact under outputs/support-cases/{case_id}/",
)
view = await ctx.workspace.open_view(purpose=f"Persist support case artifact {filename}", hints=[case_id, filename], file_types=(), max_files=1, mode=WorkspaceMode.READ_WRITE_OVERLAY, reason="Persist generated support-to-fix engineering artifact under outputs/support-cases/{case_id}/")
await view.write(rel_path, data)
except Exception as exc: # workspace may be unavailable in local smoke invocations
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind="workspace_write_warning", payload={"path": rel_path, "message": redact_secrets(str(exc))[:500]}))
except Exception as exc:
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind="workspace_write_warning", payload={"path": rel_path, "message": redact(str(exc))[:500]}))
try:
ref = await ctx.write_artifact(rel_path.replace("/", "__"), data, mime_type_for(filename))
ref = await ctx.write_artifact(rel_path.replace("/", "__"), data, mime(filename))
await ctx.emit_artifact(ref)
artifact_uri = ref.uri
except Exception as exc:
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind="artifact_warning", payload={"path": rel_path, "message": redact_secrets(str(exc))[:500]}))
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind="artifact_warning", payload={"path": rel_path, "message": redact(str(exc))[:500]}))
return ArtifactRecord(path=rel_path, artifact_uri=artifact_uri, sha256=digest, size_bytes=len(data))
def mime_type_for(filename: str) -> str:
def mime(filename: str) -> str:
if filename.endswith(".json"):
return "application/json"
if filename.endswith(".md"):