Pin LaunchCheck requests to validated DNS

a2a.yaml

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 name: launch-check-studio-v1
-version: 0.1.0
+version: 0.1.1
 entrypoint: agent:LaunchCheckStudioV1
 expose:
   public: false
@@ -29,4 +29,4 @@ runtime:
     max_runtime_seconds: 120
   egress:
     deny_internet_by_default: false
-  tools_used: [httpx, psycopg, postgres]
+  tools_used: [aiohttp, psycopg, postgres]

agent.py

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ import socket
 from dataclasses import dataclass
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from html.parser import HTMLParser
-from typing import Any
+from typing import Annotated, Any
 from urllib.parse import urljoin, urlparse, urlunparse
 
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
@@ -61,6 +61,41 @@ class FetchResult:
     error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
 
 
+class _PinnedResolver:
+    """Resolve one hostname only to addresses validated before the request."""
+
+    def __init__(self, hostname: str, addresses: tuple[str, ...]) -> None:
+        self._hostname = hostname.lower().rstrip(".")
+        self._addresses = addresses
+
+    async def resolve(
+        self,
+        host: str,
+        port: int = 0,
+        family: int = socket.AF_UNSPEC,
+    ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+        if host.lower().rstrip(".") != self._hostname:
+            raise OSError("resolver hostname mismatch")
+        return [
+            {
+                "hostname": host,
+                "host": address,
+                "port": port,
+                "family": (
+                    socket.AF_INET6
+                    if ipaddress.ip_address(address).version == 6
+                    else socket.AF_INET
+                ),
+                "proto": 0,
+                "flags": 0,
+            }
+            for address in self._addresses
+        ]
+
+    async def close(self) -> None:
+        return None
+
+
 class _HeadParser(HTMLParser):
     def __init__(self) -> None:
         super().__init__()
@@ -110,7 +145,7 @@ class LaunchCheckStudioV1(A2AAgent[LaunchCheckStudioV1Config, PlatformUserAuth])
         "LaunchCheck audits public HTTP(S) launch pages with bounded SSRF-safe "
         "network checks and user-scoped Postgres persistence."
     )
-    version = "0.1.0"
+    version = "0.1.1"
 
     config_model = LaunchCheckStudioV1Config
     auth_model = PlatformUserAuth
@@ -119,7 +154,7 @@ class LaunchCheckStudioV1(A2AAgent[LaunchCheckStudioV1Config, PlatformUserAuth])
     state_model = LaunchCheckStudioV1State
     resources = Resources(cpu="500m", memory="512Mi", max_runtime_seconds=120)
     egress = EgressPolicy(deny_internet_by_default=False)
-    tools_used = ("httpx", "psycopg", "postgres")
+    tools_used = ("aiohttp", "psycopg", "postgres")
     pricing = Pricing(
         price_per_call_usd=0.0,
         caller_pays_llm=False,
@@ -140,14 +175,17 @@ class LaunchCheckStudioV1(A2AAgent[LaunchCheckStudioV1Config, PlatformUserAuth])
     @a2a.tool(
         description="Run a bounded SSRF-safe launch readiness audit for a public HTTP(S) URL and persist the report.",
         timeout_seconds=60,
-        idempotent=True,
+        idempotent=False,
         cost_class="network-read",
     )
     async def audit_url(
         self,
         ctx: RunContext[PlatformUserAuth],
-        audit_id: str,
-        url: str,
+        audit_id: Annotated[
+            str,
+            Field(min_length=1, max_length=128, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,127}$"),
+        ],
+        url: Annotated[str, Field(min_length=8, max_length=2048)],
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         tenant = _tenant_key(ctx)
         audit_id = _clean_audit_id(audit_id)
@@ -202,7 +240,10 @@ class LaunchCheckStudioV1(A2AAgent[LaunchCheckStudioV1Config, PlatformUserAuth])
     async def get_audit(
         self,
         ctx: RunContext[PlatformUserAuth],
-        audit_id: str,
+        audit_id: Annotated[
+            str,
+            Field(min_length=1, max_length=128, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.:-]{0,127}$"),
+        ],
     ) -> dict[str, Any]:
         tenant = _tenant_key(ctx)
         audit_id = _clean_audit_id(audit_id)
@@ -273,42 +314,66 @@ async def _validate_public_url(raw_url: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     host = parsed.hostname.strip().rstrip(".")
     if not host:
         return {"ok": False, "code": "invalid_url", "message": "URL must include a hostname."}
-    if parsed.port is not None and not (1 <= parsed.port <= 65535):
+    try:
+        port = parsed.port
+    except ValueError:
         return {"ok": False, "code": "invalid_url", "message": "URL port is invalid."}
-    blocked = await _host_is_disallowed(host, parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80))
-    if blocked:
+    if port is not None and not (1 <= port <= 65535):
+        return {"ok": False, "code": "invalid_url", "message": "URL port is invalid."}
+    try:
+        host = str(ipaddress.ip_address(host.strip("[]")))
+    except ValueError:
+        try:
+            host = host.encode("idna").decode("ascii").lower()
+        except UnicodeError:
+            return {"ok": False, "code": "invalid_url", "message": "URL hostname is invalid."}
+    addresses = await _resolve_public_addresses(
+        host,
+        port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80),
+    )
+    if addresses is None:
         return {"ok": False, "code": "disallowed_private_target", "message": "Target resolves to a non-public network address."}
-    netloc = host
-    if parsed.port:
-        netloc = f"{host}:{parsed.port}"
+    if not addresses:
+        return {"ok": False, "code": "dns_resolution_failed", "message": "Target hostname could not be resolved safely."}
+    netloc = f"[{host}]" if ":" in host else host
+    if port:
+        netloc = f"{netloc}:{port}"
     normalized = urlunparse((parsed.scheme.lower(), netloc, parsed.path or "", "", parsed.query, ""))
-    return {"ok": True, "url": normalized}
+    return {
+        "ok": True,
+        "url": normalized,
+        "hostname": host,
+        "port": port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80),
+        "addresses": addresses,
+    }
 
 
-async def _host_is_disallowed(host: str, port: int) -> bool:
+async def _resolve_public_addresses(host: str, port: int) -> tuple[str, ...] | None:
     try:
         ip = ipaddress.ip_address(host.strip("[]"))
-        return _ip_disallowed(ip)
+        return None if _ip_disallowed(ip) else (str(ip),)
     except ValueError:
         pass
     lowered = host.lower()
     if lowered in {"localhost", "metadata.google.internal"} or lowered.endswith(".localhost"):
-        return True
+        return None
     try:
         infos = await asyncio.wait_for(
             asyncio.get_running_loop().getaddrinfo(host, port, type=socket.SOCK_STREAM),
             timeout=DNS_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
         )
-    except Exception:  # DNS failure is not private, fetch will return a structured network error
-        return False
+    except Exception:
+        return ()
     addresses: set[str] = set()
     for info in infos:
         sockaddr = info[4]
         if sockaddr:
             addresses.add(str(sockaddr[0]))
     if not addresses:
-        return True
-    return any(_ip_disallowed(ipaddress.ip_address(address)) for address in addresses)
+        return ()
+    if any(_ip_disallowed(ipaddress.ip_address(address)) for address in addresses):
+        return None
+    return tuple(sorted(addresses))
 
 
 def _ip_disallowed(ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
@@ -325,44 +390,76 @@ def _ip_disallowed(ip: ipaddress._BaseAddress) -> bool:
 
 
 async def _fetch_bounded(url: str, max_redirects: int, max_bytes: int) -> FetchResult:
-    import httpx
-
     current = url
     chain: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    timeout = httpx.Timeout(TOTAL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, connect=CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS, read=READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
-    async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=False, trust_env=False, headers={"user-agent": USER_AGENT}) as client:
-        for hop in range(max_redirects + 1):
-            validation = await _validate_public_url(current)
-            if not validation["ok"]:
-                return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": validation["code"], "message": validation["message"]})
-            try:
-                async with client.stream("GET", validation["url"]) as response:
-                    body = await _read_limited(response, max_bytes)
-            except httpx.TimeoutException:
-                return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": "network_timeout", "message": "The target did not respond within the bounded timeout."})
-            except httpx.HTTPError:
-                return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": "network_error", "message": "The target could not be reached safely."})
-            headers = {k.lower(): v[:1000] for k, v in response.headers.items()}
-            status = response.status_code
-            if status in {301, 302, 303, 307, 308} and response.headers.get("location"):
-                location = response.headers["location"]
-                next_url = urljoin(str(response.url), location)
-                chain.append({"from": validation["url"], "to": _safe_url_echo(next_url), "status_code": status})
-                if hop >= max_redirects:
-                    return FetchResult(validation["url"], status, headers, body, chain, {"code": "too_many_redirects", "message": "Redirect count exceeded the audit limit."})
-                next_validation = await _validate_public_url(next_url)
-                if not next_validation["ok"]:
-                    return FetchResult(validation["url"], status, headers, body, chain, {"code": next_validation["code"], "message": next_validation["message"]})
-                current = next_validation["url"]
-                continue
-            return FetchResult(str(response.url), status, headers, body, chain)
+    for hop in range(max_redirects + 1):
+        validation = await _validate_public_url(current)
+        if not validation["ok"]:
+            return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": validation["code"], "message": validation["message"]})
+        try:
+            status, headers, body, response_url = await _request_pinned(
+                validation,
+                max_bytes=max_bytes,
+                total_timeout=TOTAL_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                connect_timeout=CONNECT_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+                read_timeout=READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
+            )
+        except TimeoutError:
+            return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": "network_timeout", "message": "The target did not respond within the bounded timeout."})
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 - return a stable public network error
+            return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": "network_error", "message": "The target could not be reached safely."})
+        if status in {301, 302, 303, 307, 308} and headers.get("location"):
+            next_url = urljoin(response_url, headers["location"])
+            chain.append({"from": validation["url"], "to": _safe_url_echo(next_url), "status_code": status})
+            if hop >= max_redirects:
+                return FetchResult(validation["url"], status, headers, body, chain, {"code": "too_many_redirects", "message": "Redirect count exceeded the audit limit."})
+            current = next_url
+            continue
+        return FetchResult(response_url, status, headers, body, chain)
     return FetchResult(current, None, {}, b"", chain, {"code": "too_many_redirects", "message": "Redirect count exceeded the audit limit."})
 
 
+async def _request_pinned(
+    validation: dict[str, Any],
+    *,
+    max_bytes: int,
+    total_timeout: float,
+    connect_timeout: float,
+    read_timeout: float,
+) -> tuple[int, dict[str, str], bytes, str]:
+    import aiohttp
+
+    resolver = _PinnedResolver(
+        str(validation["hostname"]),
+        tuple(str(item) for item in validation["addresses"]),
+    )
+    connector = aiohttp.TCPConnector(resolver=resolver, use_dns_cache=False)
+    timeout = aiohttp.ClientTimeout(
+        total=total_timeout,
+        connect=connect_timeout,
+        sock_connect=connect_timeout,
+        sock_read=read_timeout,
+    )
+    try:
+        async with aiohttp.ClientSession(
+            connector=connector,
+            connector_owner=True,
+            timeout=timeout,
+            trust_env=False,
+            headers={"user-agent": USER_AGENT, "accept-encoding": "identity"},
+        ) as client:
+            async with client.get(validation["url"], allow_redirects=False) as response:
+                body = await _read_limited(response, max_bytes)
+                headers = {key.lower(): value[:1000] for key, value in response.headers.items()}
+                return response.status, headers, body, str(response.url)
+    except asyncio.TimeoutError as exc:
+        raise TimeoutError("bounded request timed out") from exc
+
+
 async def _read_limited(response: Any, max_bytes: int) -> bytes:
     chunks: list[bytes] = []
     total = 0
-    async for chunk in response.aiter_bytes():
+    async for chunk in response.content.iter_chunked(64 * 1024):
         total += len(chunk)
         if total > max_bytes:
             remaining = max_bytes - (total - len(chunk))
@@ -379,16 +476,17 @@ async def _check_robots(final_url: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     validation = await _validate_public_url(robots_url)
     if not validation["ok"]:
         return {"present": False, "status_code": None, "checked_url": _safe_url_echo(robots_url)}
-    import httpx
-
-    timeout = httpx.Timeout(6.0, connect=2.0, read=3.0)
     try:
-        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=timeout, follow_redirects=False, trust_env=False, headers={"user-agent": USER_AGENT}) as client:
-            async with client.stream("GET", validation["url"]) as response:
-                body = await _read_limited(response, MAX_ROBOTS_BYTES)
+        status, _headers, body, _response_url = await _request_pinned(
+            validation,
+            max_bytes=MAX_ROBOTS_BYTES,
+            total_timeout=6.0,
+            connect_timeout=2.0,
+            read_timeout=3.0,
+        )
         return {
-            "present": response.status_code == 200,
-            "status_code": response.status_code,
+            "present": status == 200,
+            "status_code": status,
             "checked_url": validation["url"],
             "bytes_read": len(body),
         }

frontend/package.json

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "name": "launch-check-studio-v1-frontend",
   "private": true,
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.1.1",
   "type": "module",
   "scripts": {
     "dev": "vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173",

frontend/src/App.jsx

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ export function App() {
             HTTPS, page metadata, robots.txt, and key security headers, then saves the evidence for your account.
           </p>
           <div className="trust-bar" aria-label="Safety guarantees">
-            <span>SSRF-safe DNS + redirects</span>
+            <span>Pinned public DNS + safe redirects</span>
             <span>User-scoped Postgres</span>
             <span>No LLM or secrets in browser</span>
           </div>

requirements.txt

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 # a2a-pack is auto-installed by the deploy build.
-httpx>=0.27
+aiohttp>=3.10,<4
 psycopg[binary]>=3.2
 pytest>=8.0

tests/test_full_stack_contract.py

@@ -57,8 +57,8 @@ async def test_acceptance_success_reload_and_receipt(monkeypatch):
     os.environ.pop("DATABASE_URL", None)
     stored = {}
 
-    async def fake_host_allowed(host, port):
-        return False
+    async def fake_public_addresses(host, port):
+        return ("93.184.216.34",)
 
     async def fake_fetch(url, max_redirects, max_bytes):
         return FetchResult(
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ async def test_acceptance_success_reload_and_receipt(monkeypatch):
     async def fake_load(tenant, audit_id):
         return stored.get((tenant, audit_id))
 
-    monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent, "_host_is_disallowed", fake_host_allowed)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent, "_resolve_public_addresses", fake_public_addresses)
     monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent, "_fetch_bounded", fake_fetch)
     monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent, "_check_robots", fake_robots)
     monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent, "_save_audit_and_receipt", fake_save)
@@ -146,3 +146,28 @@ async def test_url_policy_rejects_dangerous_inputs(monkeypatch):
 
     monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent.asyncio, "get_running_loop", lambda: FakeLoop())
     assert (await launch_agent._validate_public_url("https://rebinding.test"))["code"] == "disallowed_private_target"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_validated_dns_addresses_are_pinned_for_connection(monkeypatch):
+    calls = {"count": 0}
+
+    async def fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, type):
+        calls["count"] += 1
+        return [(None, None, None, None, ("93.184.216.34", port))]
+
+    class FakeLoop:
+        def getaddrinfo(self, host, port, type):
+            return fake_getaddrinfo(host, port, type)
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(launch_agent.asyncio, "get_running_loop", lambda: FakeLoop())
+    validation = await launch_agent._validate_public_url("https://rebinding.test/path")
+
+    assert validation["ok"] is True
+    assert validation["addresses"] == ("93.184.216.34",)
+    resolver = launch_agent._PinnedResolver(
+        validation["hostname"], validation["addresses"]
+    )
+    resolved = await resolver.resolve(validation["hostname"], validation["port"])
+    assert [item["host"] for item in resolved] == ["93.184.216.34"]
+    assert calls["count"] == 1