a2a-source-edit: write agent.py
This commit is contained in:
a2a-cloud
944
agent.py
944
agent.py
@@ -1,189 +1,839 @@
|
||||
"""agent-compliance-auditor agent.
|
||||
"""Read-only A2A agent compliance auditor.
|
||||
|
||||
Starter stack:
|
||||
- DeepAgents for tool-calling orchestration
|
||||
- Caller-provided LLM credentials via ctx.llm
|
||||
- A tiny model-call middleware hook you can replace with tracing,
|
||||
routing, rate limits, or policy checks
|
||||
This agent is deterministic by design: it does not call an LLM, does not execute
|
||||
arbitrary commands, does not mutate production systems, and treats all audited
|
||||
content as untrusted evidence. External integrations are optional and
|
||||
caller-configured; when they are absent the corresponding evidence is marked as
|
||||
``unknown`` / ``not_tested`` rather than guessed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import asyncio
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from datetime import UTC, datetime
|
||||
from enum import Enum
|
||||
from fnmatch import fnmatch
|
||||
from typing import Any, Literal
|
||||
from urllib.parse import urlparse
|
||||
|
||||
from pydantic import BaseModel
|
||||
import httpx
|
||||
from pydantic import AnyHttpUrl, BaseModel, ConfigDict, Field, field_validator, model_validator
|
||||
|
||||
import a2a_pack as a2a
|
||||
from a2a_pack import (
|
||||
A2AAgent,
|
||||
LLMProvisioning,
|
||||
{{ auth_type }},
|
||||
ConsumerSetup,
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField,
|
||||
EgressPolicy,
|
||||
NoAuth,
|
||||
Pricing,
|
||||
Resources,
|
||||
RunContext,
|
||||
WorkspaceAccess,
|
||||
WorkspaceMode,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from a2a_pack.context import LLMCreds
|
||||
from a2a_pack.context import AgentEvent
|
||||
from a2a_pack.workspace import FileType
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AgentComplianceAuditorConfig(BaseModel):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
MAX_TEXT_BYTES = 256_000
|
||||
MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES = 8_000
|
||||
MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT = 80
|
||||
MAX_FINDINGS = 200
|
||||
HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 8.0
|
||||
ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS = (
|
||||
"agent.py",
|
||||
"a2a.yaml",
|
||||
"requirements.txt",
|
||||
"README.md",
|
||||
"pyproject.toml",
|
||||
"Dockerfile",
|
||||
"*.py",
|
||||
"*.yaml",
|
||||
"*.yml",
|
||||
"*.json",
|
||||
"*.md",
|
||||
"tests/*.py",
|
||||
"tests/**/*.py",
|
||||
"skills/**/SKILL.md",
|
||||
)
|
||||
DENIED_REPO_GLOBS = (
|
||||
".git/**",
|
||||
"**/.env",
|
||||
"**/.env.*",
|
||||
"**/*secret*",
|
||||
"**/*credential*",
|
||||
"**/id_rsa",
|
||||
"**/*.pem",
|
||||
"**/*.key",
|
||||
)
|
||||
SECRET_PATTERNS = (
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)(api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{12,})"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
|
||||
re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{16,}"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
WRITE_INDICATORS = (
|
||||
"kubectl apply",
|
||||
"kubectl delete",
|
||||
"kubectl patch",
|
||||
"kubectl scale",
|
||||
"helm upgrade",
|
||||
"git push",
|
||||
"write_file(",
|
||||
"ctx.secret(",
|
||||
"OPENAI_API_KEY",
|
||||
"A2A_LITELLM_KEY",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
SYSTEM_PROMPT = """\
|
||||
You are a compact tool-calling agent.
|
||||
|
||||
Use the text_stats tool when the user asks about text, counts, summaries,
|
||||
or anything where exact length/word numbers would help. Mention tool results
|
||||
briefly instead of dumping raw JSON.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
RUNTIME_SKILLS_DIR = "agent-compliance-auditor/.deepagents/skills/"
|
||||
DEEPAGENTS_RECURSION_LIMIT = 500
|
||||
class StrictModel(BaseModel):
|
||||
model_config = ConfigDict(extra="forbid")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, {{ auth_type }}]):
|
||||
class Severity(str, Enum):
|
||||
CRITICAL = "critical"
|
||||
HIGH = "high"
|
||||
MEDIUM = "medium"
|
||||
LOW = "low"
|
||||
INFO = "info"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Confidence(str, Enum):
|
||||
HIGH = "high"
|
||||
MEDIUM = "medium"
|
||||
LOW = "low"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ProbeMode(str, Enum):
|
||||
NONE = "none"
|
||||
HEALTH_ONLY = "health_only"
|
||||
SYNTHETIC = "synthetic"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditScope(str, Enum):
|
||||
CARD = "card"
|
||||
CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
|
||||
RUNTIME = "runtime"
|
||||
REPOSITORY = "repository"
|
||||
RISK = "risk"
|
||||
REMEDIATION = "remediation"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Evidence(StrictModel):
|
||||
id: str
|
||||
source: str
|
||||
path: str | None = None
|
||||
status: Literal["observed", "missing", "unknown", "not_tested", "redacted"]
|
||||
excerpt: str = Field(default="", max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES)
|
||||
sha256: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class Finding(StrictModel):
|
||||
id: str
|
||||
control_id: str
|
||||
title: str
|
||||
severity: Severity
|
||||
confidence: Confidence
|
||||
status: Literal["open", "passed", "unknown", "not_tested"] = "open"
|
||||
evidence_refs: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
|
||||
impact: str
|
||||
remediation: str
|
||||
verification_procedure: str
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class OutputFile(StrictModel):
|
||||
path: str
|
||||
artifact_uri: str | None = None
|
||||
mime_type: str
|
||||
size_bytes: int = Field(ge=0)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditTarget(StrictModel):
|
||||
agent_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128, pattern=r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,127}$")
|
||||
agent_url: AnyHttpUrl | None = None
|
||||
repository: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=256)
|
||||
namespace: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
|
||||
deployment: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
|
||||
|
||||
@field_validator("repository", "namespace", "deployment")
|
||||
@classmethod
|
||||
def _clean_optional(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
if value is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
clean = value.strip()
|
||||
return clean or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditOptions(StrictModel):
|
||||
audit_id: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=80, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
|
||||
max_files: int = Field(default=40, ge=0, le=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT)
|
||||
probe_mode: ProbeMode = ProbeMode.HEALTH_ONLY
|
||||
include_repository: bool = True
|
||||
include_runtime: bool = True
|
||||
include_remediation: bool = True
|
||||
allowed_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
|
||||
allowed_namespaces: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InventoryRequest(StrictModel):
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditConfigurationRequest(StrictModel):
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
|
||||
inventory: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AuditRuntimeRequest(StrictModel):
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
|
||||
inventory: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AssessRiskRequest(StrictModel):
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
|
||||
inventory: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
configuration_findings: list[Finding] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_FINDINGS)
|
||||
runtime_findings: list[Finding] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_FINDINGS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GenerateRemediationRequest(StrictModel):
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
|
||||
findings: list[Finding] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=MAX_FINDINGS)
|
||||
risk_summary: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class InventoryResult(StrictModel):
|
||||
audit_id: str
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
status: Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"]
|
||||
output_dir: str
|
||||
generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
inventory: dict[str, Any]
|
||||
evidence: list[Evidence] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
mutations_performed: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class FindingResult(StrictModel):
|
||||
audit_id: str
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
status: Literal["ok", "partial", "setup_required"]
|
||||
output_dir: str
|
||||
generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
findings: list[Finding]
|
||||
evidence: list[Evidence] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
mutations_performed: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RiskSummaryResult(StrictModel):
|
||||
audit_id: str
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
status: Literal["ok", "partial"]
|
||||
output_dir: str
|
||||
generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
risk_summary: dict[str, Any]
|
||||
findings: list[Finding]
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
mutations_performed: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class RemediationResult(StrictModel):
|
||||
audit_id: str
|
||||
target: AuditTarget
|
||||
status: Literal["ok", "partial"]
|
||||
output_dir: str
|
||||
generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
remediation_markdown: str
|
||||
sarif: dict[str, Any]
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
|
||||
mutations_performed: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AgentComplianceAuditorConfig(StrictModel):
|
||||
default_allowed_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=50)
|
||||
default_allowed_namespaces: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=50)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, NoAuth]):
|
||||
name = "agent-compliance-auditor"
|
||||
description = "Read-only compliance auditor for deployed A2A agents and repositories."
|
||||
description = (
|
||||
"Read-only compliance auditor for deployed A2A agents and repositories. "
|
||||
"Produces bounded evidence, stable findings, risk summaries, and remediation artifacts."
|
||||
)
|
||||
version = "0.1.0"
|
||||
|
||||
config_model = AgentComplianceAuditorConfig
|
||||
auth_model = {{ auth_type }}
|
||||
|
||||
# Hosted generated agents read the caller's saved LLM credential through
|
||||
# ctx.llm. The platform may proxy that credential through LiteLLM, but agent
|
||||
# code never reads provider keys, LiteLLM master keys, or OPENAI_API_KEY
|
||||
# directly.
|
||||
llm_provisioning = LLMProvisioning.PLATFORM
|
||||
auth_model = NoAuth
|
||||
pricing = Pricing(
|
||||
price_per_call_usd=0.0,
|
||||
caller_pays_llm=True,
|
||||
notes="Starter agent uses the caller's saved LLM credential via ctx.llm.",
|
||||
caller_pays_llm=False,
|
||||
notes="Deterministic read-only auditing; no LLM calls and no production mutations.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
resources = Resources(cpu="500m", memory="512Mi", max_runtime_seconds=900)
|
||||
workspace_access = WorkspaceAccess.dynamic(
|
||||
max_files=64,
|
||||
max_files=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT + 10,
|
||||
allowed_modes=(WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY, WorkspaceMode.READ_WRITE_OVERLAY),
|
||||
require_reason=False,
|
||||
deny_patterns=DENIED_REPO_GLOBS,
|
||||
max_total_size_bytes=12 * 1024 * 1024,
|
||||
)
|
||||
egress = EgressPolicy(
|
||||
allow_hosts=(
|
||||
"gitea.a2a.svc.cluster.local",
|
||||
"argocd-server.argocd.svc.cluster.local",
|
||||
"kubernetes.default.svc",
|
||||
"registry-1.docker.io",
|
||||
"ghcr.io",
|
||||
),
|
||||
deny_internet_by_default=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
tools_used = ("httpx", "pydantic", "workspace")
|
||||
consumer_setup = ConsumerSetup.from_fields(
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.config("GITEA_BASE_URL", label="Gitea base URL", required=False, input_type="url"),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.secret("GITEA_TOKEN", label="Gitea read-only token", required=False),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.config("KUBERNETES_BASE_URL", label="Kubernetes API base URL", required=False, input_type="url"),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.secret("KUBERNETES_TOKEN", label="Kubernetes read-only bearer token", required=False),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.config("ARGOCD_BASE_URL", label="Argo CD base URL", required=False, input_type="url"),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.secret("ARGOCD_TOKEN", label="Argo CD read-only token", required=False),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.config("REGISTRY_BASE_URL", label="Registry metadata base URL", required=False, input_type="url"),
|
||||
ConsumerSetupField.secret("REGISTRY_TOKEN", label="Registry read-only token", required=False),
|
||||
)
|
||||
tools_used = ("deepagents", "langchain")
|
||||
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Ask the starter DeepAgent to answer with tool calls when useful")
|
||||
async def ask(self, ctx: RunContext[{{ auth_type }}], prompt: str) -> str:
|
||||
creds = ctx.llm
|
||||
await ctx.emit_progress(f"llm: {creds.model} via {creds.source}")
|
||||
if not creds.api_key:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
"LLM key required. Add an LLM credential in Settings > LLM "
|
||||
"credentials before running this agent; for local --invoke "
|
||||
"runs set AGENT_LLM_KEY."
|
||||
)
|
||||
graph = self._build_deep_agent(ctx=ctx, creds=creds)
|
||||
state = await graph.ainvoke(
|
||||
{"messages": [{"role": "user", "content": prompt}]},
|
||||
config={"recursion_limit": DEEPAGENTS_RECURSION_LIMIT},
|
||||
)
|
||||
await ctx.emit_progress("deepagent finished")
|
||||
return _last_message_text(state)
|
||||
|
||||
def _build_deep_agent(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
ctx: RunContext[{{ auth_type }}],
|
||||
creds: LLMCreds,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
# Lazy imports keep `a2a card` usable before local dependencies are
|
||||
# installed. `a2a deploy` installs requirements.txt during the build.
|
||||
from a2a_pack.deepagents import create_a2a_deep_agent
|
||||
from langchain.agents.middleware import wrap_model_call
|
||||
from langchain_core.tools import tool
|
||||
|
||||
@tool
|
||||
def text_stats(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return exact word, character, and line counts for text."""
|
||||
words = [part for part in text.split() if part.strip()]
|
||||
return json.dumps(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"characters": len(text),
|
||||
"words": len(words),
|
||||
"lines": len(text.splitlines()) or 1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@wrap_model_call
|
||||
async def log_model_call(request: Any, handler: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
messages = request.state.get("messages", [])
|
||||
print(
|
||||
"[middleware] model_call "
|
||||
f"model={creds.model} source={creds.source} messages={len(messages)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return await handler(request)
|
||||
|
||||
backend = ctx.workspace_backend()
|
||||
skill_sources = _seed_runtime_skills(backend, ctx)
|
||||
# create_a2a_deep_agent resolves provider:model strings with
|
||||
# langchain.init_chat_model from ctx.llm, preserving LiteLLM routing,
|
||||
# provider-specific extra body, and runtime model overrides.
|
||||
return create_a2a_deep_agent(
|
||||
ctx,
|
||||
creds=creds,
|
||||
backend=backend,
|
||||
skills=skill_sources or None,
|
||||
tools=[text_stats],
|
||||
middleware=[log_model_call],
|
||||
system_prompt=SYSTEM_PROMPT,
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Inventory a deployed A2A agent card, repository evidence, manifests, exposure, provenance, resources, and health", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
|
||||
async def inventory_agent(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: InventoryRequest) -> InventoryResult:
|
||||
audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="inventory_agent", target=request.target.agent_name)
|
||||
inventory, evidence, warnings, status = await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id)
|
||||
output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
|
||||
files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"inventory.json": inventory}, warnings)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="inventory_agent", findings=0)
|
||||
return InventoryResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status=status, output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, inventory=inventory, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Audit static configuration and repository files against A2A security, privacy, and platform controls", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
|
||||
async def audit_configuration(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: AuditConfigurationRequest) -> FindingResult:
|
||||
audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_configuration", target=request.target.agent_name)
|
||||
inventory = request.inventory or (await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id))[0]
|
||||
findings, evidence, warnings = _configuration_findings(request.target, inventory)
|
||||
findings = _dedupe_findings(findings)
|
||||
output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
|
||||
files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_configuration", findings=len(findings))
|
||||
return FindingResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, findings=findings, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Run bounded non-destructive runtime probes and audit deployment health without mutations", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
|
||||
async def audit_runtime(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: AuditRuntimeRequest) -> FindingResult:
|
||||
audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_runtime", target=request.target.agent_name)
|
||||
inventory = request.inventory or (await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id))[0]
|
||||
findings, evidence, warnings = await _runtime_findings(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, inventory)
|
||||
findings = _dedupe_findings(findings)
|
||||
output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
|
||||
files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_runtime", findings=len(findings))
|
||||
return FindingResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, findings=findings, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Deduplicate findings, map evidence to controls, and score severity, confidence, and aggregate risk", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
|
||||
async def assess_risk(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: AssessRiskRequest) -> RiskSummaryResult:
|
||||
audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="assess_risk", target=request.target.agent_name)
|
||||
all_findings = _dedupe_findings([*request.configuration_findings, *request.runtime_findings])
|
||||
summary = _risk_summary(all_findings)
|
||||
output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
|
||||
files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"risk-summary.json": summary, "findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in all_findings]}}, [])
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="assess_risk", findings=len(all_findings), score=summary["risk_score"])
|
||||
return RiskSummaryResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, risk_summary=summary, findings=all_findings)
|
||||
|
||||
@a2a.tool(description="Generate actionable remediation and a machine-readable SARIF report for compliance findings", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
|
||||
async def generate_remediation(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: GenerateRemediationRequest) -> RemediationResult:
|
||||
audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="generate_remediation", target=request.target.agent_name)
|
||||
findings = _dedupe_findings(request.findings)
|
||||
risk_summary = request.risk_summary or _risk_summary(findings)
|
||||
markdown = _remediation_markdown(request.target, audit_id, findings, risk_summary)
|
||||
sarif = _sarif(request.target, findings)
|
||||
output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
|
||||
files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"remediation.md": markdown, "sarif.json": sarif, "risk-summary.json": risk_summary}, [])
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="generate_remediation", findings=len(findings))
|
||||
return RemediationResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, remediation_markdown=markdown, sarif=sarif)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _collect_inventory(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], target: AuditTarget, options: AuditOptions, audit_id: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], list[Evidence], list[str], Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"]]:
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = []
|
||||
evidence: list[Evidence] = []
|
||||
status: Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"] = "ok"
|
||||
allowed_hosts = _allowed_hosts(agent, options)
|
||||
allowed_namespaces = _allowed_namespaces(agent, options)
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="resolve_identity")
|
||||
identity = {
|
||||
"agent_name": target.agent_name,
|
||||
"agent_url": str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None,
|
||||
"repository": target.repository,
|
||||
"namespace": target.namespace,
|
||||
"deployment": target.deployment,
|
||||
"authorized": _namespace_allowed(target.namespace, allowed_namespaces),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not identity["authorized"]:
|
||||
status = "partial"
|
||||
warnings.append("Target namespace is outside the configured allowlist; runtime probes skipped.")
|
||||
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="agent_card")
|
||||
card = await _fetch_agent_card(ctx, str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
|
||||
if card.get("status") == "unreachable":
|
||||
status = "unreachable" if status == "ok" else status
|
||||
evidence.append(_evidence("card", "agent_card", "observed" if card.get("card") else "unknown", card))
|
||||
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="repository_static_inspection")
|
||||
repo_files = await _read_workspace_repo(ctx, options.max_files if options.include_repository else 0, warnings)
|
||||
repo_summary = _summarize_repo(repo_files)
|
||||
evidence.extend(_repo_evidence(repo_files))
|
||||
|
||||
manifests = _extract_manifests(repo_files)
|
||||
skills = _extract_skills(card.get("card"), repo_files)
|
||||
secrets = _detect_secret_references(repo_files)
|
||||
exposure = _extract_exposure(card.get("card"), manifests)
|
||||
resources = _extract_resources(card.get("card"), manifests)
|
||||
provenance = _extract_provenance(manifests, repo_files)
|
||||
rbac = _extract_rbac(manifests)
|
||||
|
||||
health = {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "probe_mode is none"}
|
||||
if options.probe_mode is not ProbeMode.NONE and identity["authorized"]:
|
||||
await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="bounded_runtime_probe")
|
||||
health = await _health_probe(str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
|
||||
|
||||
inventory = {
|
||||
"schema_version": "2026-07-13",
|
||||
"audit_id": audit_id,
|
||||
"generated_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
|
||||
"identity": identity,
|
||||
"agent_card": card,
|
||||
"skills": skills,
|
||||
"schemas": _extract_schemas(card.get("card")),
|
||||
"manifests": manifests,
|
||||
"rbac": rbac,
|
||||
"secrets_references": secrets,
|
||||
"network_exposure": exposure,
|
||||
"image_provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"resource_limits": resources,
|
||||
"deployment_health": health,
|
||||
"repository": repo_summary,
|
||||
"controls": _controls_catalog(),
|
||||
"unknowns": _unknowns(card, manifests, health, repo_files),
|
||||
"mutations_performed": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return inventory, evidence, warnings, status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _fetch_agent_card(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
if not agent_url:
|
||||
return {"status": "unknown", "reason": "agent_url not provided"}
|
||||
parsed = urlparse(agent_url)
|
||||
if not _safe_http_url(parsed, allowed_hosts):
|
||||
warnings.append("Agent URL host is not allowlisted or is unsafe; card fetch skipped.")
|
||||
return {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "host_not_allowlisted"}
|
||||
url = agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/.well-known/agent-card"
|
||||
try:
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), follow_redirects=False) as client:
|
||||
resp = await client.get(url, headers={"accept": "application/json"})
|
||||
if resp.status_code >= 400:
|
||||
return {"status": "unreachable", "http_status": resp.status_code, "body_excerpt": _redact(resp.text[:500])}
|
||||
data = _bounded_json(resp.text, warnings)
|
||||
return {"status": "ok", "url": url, "card": data}
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
warnings.append(f"Agent card fetch failed: {type(exc).__name__}")
|
||||
return {"status": "unreachable", "error_type": type(exc).__name__}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _health_probe(agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
if not agent_url:
|
||||
return {"status": "unknown", "reason": "agent_url not provided"}
|
||||
parsed = urlparse(agent_url)
|
||||
if not _safe_http_url(parsed, allowed_hosts):
|
||||
return {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "host_not_allowlisted"}
|
||||
url = agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/healthz"
|
||||
started = time.perf_counter()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), follow_redirects=False) as client:
|
||||
resp = await client.get(url)
|
||||
return {"status": "ok" if resp.status_code < 500 else "degraded", "http_status": resp.status_code, "latency_ms": round((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000, 2)}
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
warnings.append(f"Health probe failed: {type(exc).__name__}")
|
||||
return {"status": "unreachable", "error_type": type(exc).__name__}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _read_workspace_repo(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], max_files: int, warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
if max_files <= 0:
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
view = await ctx.workspace.open_view(
|
||||
purpose="Read-only static inspection of A2A agent source files",
|
||||
hints=("agent.py a2a.yaml requirements README tests skills",),
|
||||
file_types=(FileType.PYTHON, FileType.YAML, FileType.JSON, FileType.MARKDOWN, FileType.TOML),
|
||||
max_files=max_files,
|
||||
mode=WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY,
|
||||
reason="Compliance audit reads bounded source files and never writes repository paths.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
warnings.append(f"Repository workspace unavailable: {type(exc).__name__}")
|
||||
return {}
|
||||
files: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for match in view.files[:max_files]:
|
||||
path = match.path.replace("\\", "/")
|
||||
if not _repo_path_allowed(path):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = await view.read(path)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
warnings.append(f"Could not read {path}: {type(exc).__name__}")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
files[path] = raw[:MAX_TEXT_BYTES].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
return files
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _runtime_skills_root(ctx: RunContext[Any]) -> str:
|
||||
workspace = getattr(ctx, "_workspace", None)
|
||||
prefixes = tuple(getattr(workspace, "write_prefixes", ()) or ())
|
||||
if not prefixes:
|
||||
outputs_prefix = getattr(workspace, "outputs_prefix", None)
|
||||
prefixes = (outputs_prefix or "outputs/",)
|
||||
prefix = str(prefixes[0]).strip("/")
|
||||
return f"/{prefix}/{RUNTIME_SKILLS_DIR}" if prefix else f"/{RUNTIME_SKILLS_DIR}"
|
||||
async def _write_json_bundle(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], output_dir: str, files: dict[str, Any], warnings: list[str]) -> list[OutputFile]:
|
||||
out: list[OutputFile] = []
|
||||
for name, payload in files.items():
|
||||
rel = f"{output_dir}/{name}"
|
||||
if name.endswith(".md") and isinstance(payload, str):
|
||||
data = payload.encode("utf-8")
|
||||
mime = "text/markdown"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
data = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode("utf-8")
|
||||
mime = "application/json"
|
||||
artifact_uri: str | None = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ref = await ctx.write_artifact(rel, data, mime)
|
||||
await ctx.emit_artifact(ref)
|
||||
artifact_uri = ref.uri
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
warnings.append(f"Artifact write failed for {rel}: {type(exc).__name__}")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ws = ctx.workspace
|
||||
if getattr(ws, "is_writable_output", lambda _p: False)(rel) and hasattr(ws, "write_bytes"):
|
||||
ws.write_bytes(rel, data)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
out.append(OutputFile(path=rel, artifact_uri=artifact_uri, mime_type=mime, size_bytes=len(data)))
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _seed_runtime_skills(backend: Any, ctx: RunContext[Any]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Copy packaged DeepAgents skills into the invocation workspace.
|
||||
def _configuration_findings(target: AuditTarget, inventory: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Evidence], list[str]]:
|
||||
findings: list[Finding] = []
|
||||
evidence: list[Evidence] = []
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = []
|
||||
card = (inventory.get("agent_card") or {}).get("card") or {}
|
||||
repo = inventory.get("repository") or {}
|
||||
resources = inventory.get("resource_limits") or {}
|
||||
secrets = inventory.get("secrets_references") or []
|
||||
exposure = inventory.get("network_exposure") or {}
|
||||
skills = inventory.get("skills") or []
|
||||
|
||||
DeepAgents loads skills from its backend, while source-controlled
|
||||
``skills/`` folders live in the image. This bridge lets generated agents
|
||||
ship reusable SKILL.md bundles without giving up durable A2A workspace
|
||||
files.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = Path(__file__).parent / "skills"
|
||||
if not root.exists():
|
||||
return []
|
||||
runtime_skills_root = _runtime_skills_root(ctx)
|
||||
uploads: list[tuple[str, bytes]] = []
|
||||
for path in root.rglob("*"):
|
||||
if path.is_file():
|
||||
rel = path.relative_to(root).as_posix()
|
||||
uploads.append((runtime_skills_root + rel, path.read_bytes()))
|
||||
if uploads:
|
||||
backend.upload_files(uploads)
|
||||
return [runtime_skills_root]
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if not card:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-CARD-001", "Agent Card could not be verified", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "card", "Consumers cannot validate skills, schemas, runtime, or billing metadata.", "Ensure /.well-known/agent-card is reachable over an approved host and returns a valid A2A Card.", "Fetch /.well-known/agent-card and validate that all public skills and runtime metadata are present."))
|
||||
if len(skills) == 0:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-001", "No public skills discovered", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "skills", "Callers cannot rely on a stable typed API contract.", "Expose typed @a2a.tool methods with Pydantic-compatible input and output schemas.", "Reload the live Agent Card and confirm skills[].input_schema and output_schema are non-null."))
|
||||
for skill in skills:
|
||||
schema = skill.get("input_schema") or skill.get("inputSchema") or {}
|
||||
out_schema = skill.get("output_schema") or skill.get("outputSchema") or {}
|
||||
if not _schema_strict(schema) or not out_schema:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-002", f"Skill {skill.get('name', '<unknown>')} has weak schema", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "schemas", "Weak or nullable schemas increase integration errors and prompt-injection attack surface.", "Use strict Pydantic models or explicit JSON Schema with type=object and additionalProperties=false.", "Inspect the Agent Card skill schemas and run negative validation tests for extra fields."))
|
||||
if exposure.get("public") is True and not exposure.get("documented_public_reason"):
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-NET-001", "Agent is publicly exposed without documented reason", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "network_exposure", "Unexpected public exposure can broaden abuse and data-exfiltration paths.", "Set expose.public=false unless public access is required; document the reason and authentication boundary.", "Review a2a.yaml and ingress policy; confirm exposure matches intended audience."))
|
||||
if resources.get("max_runtime_seconds") in (None, "unknown"):
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-OPS-001", "Runtime limit is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "resource_limits", "Unbounded or unknown runtime budgets can cause reliability and cost issues.", "Declare Resources(... max_runtime_seconds=...) in agent.py and mirror runtime.resources in a2a.yaml for larger pods.", "Load Agent Card runtime.resources and deployment manifest to confirm limits."))
|
||||
if secrets:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SECRET-001", "Potential secret or provider-key reference found in source", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "secrets_references", "Secrets in source or logs can be exfiltrated by callers or dependencies.", "Remove literal secrets, provider-key environment reads, and broad secret access. Use ctx.consumer_secret or declared runtime secrets only.", "Run secret scanning and verify no returned artifacts contain secret values."))
|
||||
if repo.get("suspicious_instruction_count", 0) > 0:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "Repository contains malicious instruction-like text", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "repository", "Auditors or LLM-backed tools could be manipulated if repo text is treated as instructions.", "Keep repository content in evidence fields only; never concatenate it into privileged prompts without quoting and policy guards.", "Re-run audit and confirm malicious text appears only as redacted evidence, not as executed instructions."))
|
||||
evidence.append(_evidence("configuration", "configuration_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings)}))
|
||||
return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], evidence, warnings
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _last_message_text(state: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
messages = state.get("messages") or []
|
||||
if not messages:
|
||||
return json.dumps(state, default=str)
|
||||
async def _runtime_findings(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], target: AuditTarget, options: AuditOptions, inventory: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Evidence], list[str]]:
|
||||
findings: list[Finding] = []
|
||||
evidence: list[Evidence] = []
|
||||
warnings: list[str] = []
|
||||
health = inventory.get("deployment_health") or {"status": "unknown"}
|
||||
identity = inventory.get("identity") or {}
|
||||
if identity.get("authorized") is False:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-TENANT-001", "Runtime audit skipped by namespace allowlist", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "identity", "Auditing outside the authorized tenant boundary could violate isolation policy.", "Configure allowed_namespaces for the target tenant or run the audit from the owning tenant.", "Confirm namespace allowlist contains only tenant-owned namespaces and retry."))
|
||||
if health.get("status") in {"unreachable", "degraded"}:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-001", "Agent health probe failed or degraded", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Consumers may experience failed calls or stale Agent Cards.", "Inspect deployment status, readiness probes, service routing, and recent rollout events.", "Repeat health-only probe and verify HTTP 2xx/3xx or documented readiness semantics."))
|
||||
if health.get("status") in {"unknown", "not_tested"}:
|
||||
findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-002", "Runtime health state is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Unknown runtime state leaves operational risk unmeasured.", "Provide an allowlisted agent_url and enable health_only probes; configure read-only Kubernetes/Argo metadata if needed.", "Run audit_runtime with probe_mode=health_only and verify deployment_health.status."))
|
||||
evidence.append(_evidence("runtime", "runtime_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings), "health": health}))
|
||||
return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], evidence, warnings
|
||||
|
||||
content = getattr(messages[-1], "content", None)
|
||||
if isinstance(content, str):
|
||||
return content
|
||||
if isinstance(content, list):
|
||||
parts: list[str] = []
|
||||
for item in content:
|
||||
if isinstance(item, dict):
|
||||
text = item.get("text") or item.get("content")
|
||||
if text:
|
||||
parts.append(str(text))
|
||||
elif item:
|
||||
parts.append(str(item))
|
||||
return "\n".join(parts) if parts else json.dumps(content, default=str)
|
||||
return str(content or messages[-1])
|
||||
|
||||
def _finding(target: AuditTarget, control_id: str, title: str, severity: Severity, confidence: Confidence, evidence_ref: str, impact: str, remediation: str, verification: str) -> Finding:
|
||||
base = f"{target.agent_name}|{control_id}|{title}"
|
||||
suffix = hashlib.sha256(base.encode()).hexdigest()[:10]
|
||||
return Finding(id=f"{control_id.lower()}-{suffix}", control_id=control_id, title=title, severity=severity, confidence=confidence, evidence_refs=[evidence_ref], impact=impact, remediation=remediation, verification_procedure=verification)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _dedupe_findings(findings: list[Finding]) -> list[Finding]:
|
||||
seen: dict[str, Finding] = {}
|
||||
rank = {Severity.CRITICAL: 5, Severity.HIGH: 4, Severity.MEDIUM: 3, Severity.LOW: 2, Severity.INFO: 1}
|
||||
for f in findings:
|
||||
prev = seen.get(f.id)
|
||||
if prev is None or rank[f.severity] > rank[prev.severity]:
|
||||
seen[f.id] = f
|
||||
return sorted(seen.values(), key=lambda f: (-rank[f.severity], f.control_id, f.id))[:MAX_FINDINGS]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _risk_summary(findings: list[Finding]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
weights = {Severity.CRITICAL: 100, Severity.HIGH: 40, Severity.MEDIUM: 15, Severity.LOW: 5, Severity.INFO: 1}
|
||||
counts = {s.value: 0 for s in Severity}
|
||||
score = 0
|
||||
for f in findings:
|
||||
counts[f.severity.value] += 1
|
||||
score += weights[f.severity]
|
||||
score = min(score, 100)
|
||||
if counts["critical"]:
|
||||
rating = "critical"
|
||||
elif score >= 70:
|
||||
rating = "high"
|
||||
elif score >= 30:
|
||||
rating = "medium"
|
||||
elif score > 0:
|
||||
rating = "low"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
rating = "clean"
|
||||
return {"schema_version": "2026-07-13", "risk_score": score, "risk_rating": rating, "finding_counts": counts, "top_controls": sorted({f.control_id for f in findings})[:20], "unknown_or_not_tested": [f.control_id for f in findings if f.status in {"unknown", "not_tested"}], "mutations_performed": False}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _remediation_markdown(target: AuditTarget, audit_id: str, findings: list[Finding], risk_summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
lines = [f"# Remediation plan for {target.agent_name}", "", f"Audit ID: `{audit_id}`", f"Risk rating: **{risk_summary.get('risk_rating', 'unknown')}** ({risk_summary.get('risk_score', 0)}/100)", "", "This plan is read-only output. No production systems or repositories were changed.", ""]
|
||||
if not findings:
|
||||
lines.extend(["## No open findings", "", "The synthetic audit found no policy violations in the supplied evidence. Unknown/not-tested areas should still be reviewed."])
|
||||
for f in findings:
|
||||
lines.extend([f"## {f.severity.value.upper()} — {f.title}", "", f"- Finding ID: `{f.id}`", f"- Control: `{f.control_id}`", f"- Confidence: `{f.confidence.value}`", f"- Evidence references: {', '.join(f.evidence_refs) or 'none'}", f"- Impact: {f.impact}", f"- Remediation: {f.remediation}", f"- Verification: {f.verification_procedure}", ""])
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sarif(target: AuditTarget, findings: list[Finding]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
rules = []
|
||||
results = []
|
||||
for f in findings:
|
||||
rules.append({"id": f.control_id, "name": f.title, "shortDescription": {"text": f.title}, "help": {"text": f.remediation}})
|
||||
results.append({"ruleId": f.control_id, "level": _sarif_level(f.severity), "message": {"text": f"{f.title}: {f.impact}"}, "partialFingerprints": {"findingId": f.id}, "properties": {"severity": f.severity.value, "confidence": f.confidence.value, "verification": f.verification_procedure}})
|
||||
return {"version": "2.1.0", "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/sarif-2.1.0.json", "runs": [{"tool": {"driver": {"name": "agent-compliance-auditor", "informationUri": "https://docs.a2acloud.io/", "rules": rules}}, "invocations": [{"executionSuccessful": True, "properties": {"target": target.agent_name, "mutations_performed": False}}], "results": results}]}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sarif_level(severity: Severity) -> str:
|
||||
return {Severity.CRITICAL: "error", Severity.HIGH: "error", Severity.MEDIUM: "warning", Severity.LOW: "note", Severity.INFO: "none"}[severity]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _summarize_repo(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
suspicious = 0
|
||||
indicators: list[str] = []
|
||||
for path, text in files.items():
|
||||
lower = text.lower()
|
||||
if any(token in lower for token in ("ignore previous instructions", "exfiltrate", "send secrets", "system prompt")):
|
||||
suspicious += 1
|
||||
indicators.append(path)
|
||||
return {"files_inspected": len(files), "paths": sorted(files), "suspicious_instruction_count": suspicious, "suspicious_instruction_paths": indicators[:20], "bounded_bytes_per_file": MAX_TEXT_BYTES}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_manifests(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
manifests: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
for path in ("a2a.yaml", "agent.py", "requirements.txt", "Dockerfile"):
|
||||
if path in files:
|
||||
manifests[path] = {"present": True, "sha256": _sha(files[path]), "excerpt": _redact(files[path][:1200])}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
manifests[path] = {"present": False}
|
||||
return manifests
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_skills(card: Any, files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
if isinstance(card, dict):
|
||||
skills = card.get("skills") or []
|
||||
if isinstance(skills, list):
|
||||
return [s for s in skills if isinstance(s, dict)]
|
||||
text = files.get("agent.py", "")
|
||||
names = re.findall(r"async\s+def\s+([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\s*\(", text)
|
||||
return [{"name": n, "source": "agent.py"} for n in names]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_schemas(card: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
schemas: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
if isinstance(card, dict):
|
||||
for skill in card.get("skills") or []:
|
||||
if isinstance(skill, dict):
|
||||
name = str(skill.get("name") or skill.get("id") or "unknown")
|
||||
schemas[name] = {"input_schema": skill.get("input_schema") or skill.get("inputSchema"), "output_schema": skill.get("output_schema") or skill.get("outputSchema")}
|
||||
return schemas
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _detect_secret_references(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
for path, text in files.items():
|
||||
for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS:
|
||||
for match in pattern.finditer(text):
|
||||
out.append({"path": path, "match": _redact(match.group(0))})
|
||||
for indicator in WRITE_INDICATORS:
|
||||
if indicator in text:
|
||||
out.append({"path": path, "match": _redact(indicator)})
|
||||
return out[:50]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_exposure(card: Any, manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
public = None
|
||||
text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str).lower()
|
||||
if "public: true" in text or "public=true" in text:
|
||||
public = True
|
||||
if "public: false" in text or "public=false" in text:
|
||||
public = False
|
||||
return {"public": public, "documented_public_reason": "public_reason" in text or "exposure_reason" in text, "unknown_when_null": public is None}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_resources(card: Any, manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
runtime = card.get("runtime") if isinstance(card, dict) else {}
|
||||
resources = runtime.get("resources") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else {}
|
||||
out = dict(resources or {}) if isinstance(resources, dict) else {}
|
||||
if "max_runtime_seconds" not in out:
|
||||
text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str)
|
||||
match = re.search(r"max_runtime_seconds[\s:=]+([0-9]+)", text)
|
||||
out["max_runtime_seconds"] = int(match.group(1)) if match else "unknown"
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_provenance(manifests: dict[str, Any], files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
dockerfile = files.get("Dockerfile", "")
|
||||
digest_pinned = "@sha256:" in dockerfile
|
||||
return {"dockerfile_present": bool(dockerfile), "digest_pinned_base_image": digest_pinned if dockerfile else "unknown", "source_hashes": {k: v.get("sha256") for k, v in manifests.items() if isinstance(v, dict) and v.get("sha256")}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_rbac(manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str).lower()
|
||||
return {"service_account_mentions": text.count("serviceaccount"), "cluster_role_mentions": text.count("clusterrole"), "status": "observed" if "role" in text else "unknown"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _unknowns(card: dict[str, Any], manifests: dict[str, Any], health: dict[str, Any], files: dict[str, str]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
out: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not card.get("card"):
|
||||
out.append("agent_card")
|
||||
if not files:
|
||||
out.append("repository_files")
|
||||
if health.get("status") in {"unknown", "not_tested"}:
|
||||
out.append("deployment_health")
|
||||
if not any(v.get("present") for v in manifests.values() if isinstance(v, dict)):
|
||||
out.append("source_manifests")
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _controls_catalog() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-CARD-001", "title": "Agent Card availability and integrity"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-SCHEMA-001", "title": "Public skill inventory"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-SCHEMA-002", "title": "Strict non-null schemas"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-NET-001", "title": "Network exposure minimization"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-OPS-001", "title": "Runtime resource limits"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-SECRET-001", "title": "Secret handling and redaction"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "title": "Untrusted content isolation"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-TENANT-001", "title": "Tenant and namespace isolation"},
|
||||
{"control_id": "A2A-HEALTH-001", "title": "Deployment health"},
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _schema_strict(schema: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
return isinstance(schema, dict) and schema.get("type") == "object" and schema.get("additionalProperties") is False and bool(schema.get("properties"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _repo_evidence(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[Evidence]:
|
||||
return [_evidence(f"repo:{path}", "repository", "observed", text[:1000], path=path) for path, text in list(files.items())[:MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT]]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _evidence(eid: str, source: str, status: Literal["observed", "missing", "unknown", "not_tested", "redacted"], payload: Any, path: str | None = None) -> Evidence:
|
||||
text = payload if isinstance(payload, str) else json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, default=str)
|
||||
redacted = _redact(text)[:MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES]
|
||||
return Evidence(id=eid, source=source, path=path, status=status, excerpt=redacted, sha256=_sha(text))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _audit_id(target: AuditTarget, supplied: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
if supplied:
|
||||
return supplied
|
||||
digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{target.agent_name}|{target.repository or ''}|{int(time.time())}".encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
|
||||
return f"audit-{target.agent_name}-{digest}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _output_dir(audit_id: str) -> str:
|
||||
clean = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]", "-", audit_id)[:80]
|
||||
return f"outputs/compliance/{clean}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _repo_path_allowed(path: str) -> bool:
|
||||
clean = path.replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
|
||||
if ".." in clean.split("/"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if any(fnmatch(clean, pat) for pat in DENIED_REPO_GLOBS):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return any(fnmatch(clean, pat) for pat in ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _allowed_hosts(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, options: AuditOptions) -> set[str]:
|
||||
return {h.lower().strip() for h in [*agent.config.default_allowed_hosts, *options.allowed_hosts] if h.strip()}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _allowed_namespaces(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, options: AuditOptions) -> set[str]:
|
||||
return {n.strip() for n in [*agent.config.default_allowed_namespaces, *options.allowed_namespaces] if n.strip()}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _namespace_allowed(namespace: str | None, allowed_namespaces: set[str]) -> bool:
|
||||
if not allowed_namespaces:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool(namespace and namespace in allowed_namespaces)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_http_url(parsed: Any, allowed_hosts: set[str]) -> bool:
|
||||
if parsed.scheme not in {"https", "http"}:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
|
||||
if not host or host in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"} or host.startswith("169.254.") or host.endswith(".local"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return host in allowed_hosts
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bounded_json(text: str, warnings: list[str]) -> Any:
|
||||
if len(text.encode("utf-8")) > MAX_TEXT_BYTES:
|
||||
warnings.append("HTTP JSON response exceeded evidence bound and was truncated before parsing.")
|
||||
text = text[:MAX_TEXT_BYTES]
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return json.loads(text)
|
||||
except json.JSONDecodeError:
|
||||
warnings.append("HTTP response was not valid JSON.")
|
||||
return {"invalid_json_excerpt": _redact(text[:1000])}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _redact(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
out = text
|
||||
for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS:
|
||||
out = pattern.sub(lambda m: m.group(0)[:8] + "…REDACTED", out)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sha(text: str) -> str:
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _dump(model_or_value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
if isinstance(model_or_value, BaseModel):
|
||||
return model_or_value.model_dump(mode="json")
|
||||
return model_or_value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
async def _event(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], kind: str, **payload: Any) -> None:
|
||||
safe_payload = json.loads(json.dumps(payload, default=str))
|
||||
await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind=kind, payload=safe_payload))
|
||||
if kind in {"audit_started", "audit_progress", "audit_completed"}:
|
||||
message = safe_payload.get("phase") or safe_payload.get("skill") or kind
|
||||
await ctx.emit_progress(f"{kind}: {message}")
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user