diff --git a/agent.py b/agent.py
index 797112b..f3bc6d3 100644
--- a/agent.py
+++ b/agent.py
@@ -1,14 +1,6 @@
-"""Read-only A2A agent compliance auditor.
-
-This agent is deterministic by design: it does not call an LLM, does not execute
-arbitrary commands, does not mutate production systems, and treats all audited
-content as untrusted evidence. External integrations are optional and
-caller-configured; when they are absent the corresponding evidence is marked as
-``unknown`` / ``not_tested`` rather than guessed.
-"""
+"""Deterministic read-only compliance auditor for A2A agents."""
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import asyncio
 import hashlib
 import json
 import re
@@ -38,55 +30,19 @@ from a2a_pack import (
 from a2a_pack.context import AgentEvent
 from a2a_pack.workspace import FileType
 
-
 MAX_TEXT_BYTES = 256_000
 MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES = 8_000
 MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT = 80
 MAX_FINDINGS = 200
 HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 8.0
-ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS = (
-    "agent.py",
-    "a2a.yaml",
-    "requirements.txt",
-    "README.md",
-    "pyproject.toml",
-    "Dockerfile",
-    "*.py",
-    "*.yaml",
-    "*.yml",
-    "*.json",
-    "*.md",
-    "tests/*.py",
-    "tests/**/*.py",
-    "skills/**/SKILL.md",
-)
-DENIED_REPO_GLOBS = (
-    ".git/**",
-    "**/.env",
-    "**/.env.*",
-    "**/*secret*",
-    "**/*credential*",
-    "**/id_rsa",
-    "**/*.pem",
-    "**/*.key",
-)
+DENIED_REPO_GLOBS = (".git/**", "**/.env", "**/.env.*", "**/*secret*", "**/*credential*", "**/id_rsa", "**/*.pem", "**/*.key")
+ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS = ("agent.py", "a2a.yaml", "requirements.txt", "README.md", "pyproject.toml", "Dockerfile", "*.py", "*.yaml", "*.yml", "*.json", "*.md", "tests/*.py", "tests/**/*.py", "skills/**/SKILL.md")
 SECRET_PATTERNS = (
     re.compile(r"(?i)(api[_-]?key|token|secret|password)\s*[:=]\s*['\"]?([A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{12,})"),
     re.compile(r"sk-[A-Za-z0-9]{20,}"),
     re.compile(r"(?i)bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9_./+=-]{16,}"),
 )
-WRITE_INDICATORS = (
-    "kubectl apply",
-    "kubectl delete",
-    "kubectl patch",
-    "kubectl scale",
-    "helm upgrade",
-    "git push",
-    "write_file(",
-    "ctx.secret(",
-    "OPENAI_API_KEY",
-    "A2A_LITELLM_KEY",
-)
+WRITE_INDICATORS = ("kubectl apply", "kubectl delete", "kubectl patch", "kubectl scale", "helm upgrade", "git push", "ctx.secret(", "OPENAI_API_KEY", "A2A_LITELLM_KEY")
 
 
 class StrictModel(BaseModel):
@@ -113,22 +69,30 @@ class ProbeMode(str, Enum):
     SYNTHETIC = "synthetic"
 
 
-class AuditScope(str, Enum):
-    CARD = "card"
-    CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
-    RUNTIME = "runtime"
-    REPOSITORY = "repository"
-    RISK = "risk"
-    REMEDIATION = "remediation"
+class AuditTarget(StrictModel):
+    agent_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128, pattern=r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,127}$")
+    agent_url: AnyHttpUrl | None = None
+    repository: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=256)
+    namespace: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
+    deployment: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
+
+    @field_validator("repository", "namespace", "deployment")
+    @classmethod
+    def clean_optional(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
+        if value is None:
+            return None
+        return value.strip() or None
 
 
-class Evidence(StrictModel):
-    id: str
-    source: str
-    path: str | None = None
-    status: Literal["observed", "missing", "unknown", "not_tested", "redacted"]
-    excerpt: str = Field(default="", max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES)
-    sha256: str | None = None
+class AuditOptions(StrictModel):
+    audit_id: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=80, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
+    max_files: int = Field(default=40, ge=0, le=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT)
+    probe_mode: ProbeMode = ProbeMode.HEALTH_ONLY
+    include_repository: bool = True
+    include_runtime: bool = True
+    include_remediation: bool = True
+    allowed_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
+    allowed_namespaces: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
 
 
 class Finding(StrictModel):
@@ -144,6 +108,15 @@ class Finding(StrictModel):
     verification_procedure: str
 
 
+class Evidence(StrictModel):
+    id: str
+    source: str
+    path: str | None = None
+    status: Literal["observed", "missing", "unknown", "not_tested", "redacted"]
+    excerpt: str = Field(default="", max_length=MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES)
+    sha256: str | None = None
+
+
 class OutputFile(StrictModel):
     path: str
     artifact_uri: str | None = None
@@ -151,33 +124,6 @@ class OutputFile(StrictModel):
     size_bytes: int = Field(ge=0)
 
 
-class AuditTarget(StrictModel):
-    agent_name: str = Field(min_length=1, max_length=128, pattern=r"^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,127}$")
-    agent_url: AnyHttpUrl | None = None
-    repository: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=256)
-    namespace: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
-    deployment: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=128)
-
-    @field_validator("repository", "namespace", "deployment")
-    @classmethod
-    def _clean_optional(cls, value: str | None) -> str | None:
-        if value is None:
-            return None
-        clean = value.strip()
-        return clean or None
-
-
-class AuditOptions(StrictModel):
-    audit_id: str | None = Field(default=None, max_length=80, pattern=r"^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$")
-    max_files: int = Field(default=40, ge=0, le=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT)
-    probe_mode: ProbeMode = ProbeMode.HEALTH_ONLY
-    include_repository: bool = True
-    include_runtime: bool = True
-    include_remediation: bool = True
-    allowed_hosts: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
-    allowed_namespaces: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=20)
-
-
 class InventoryRequest(StrictModel):
     target: AuditTarget
     options: AuditOptions = Field(default_factory=AuditOptions)
@@ -210,13 +156,52 @@ class GenerateRemediationRequest(StrictModel):
     risk_summary: dict[str, Any] | None = None
 
 
-AgentStatus = Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"]
+class InventoryResult(StrictModel):
+    audit_id: str
+    target: AuditTarget
+    status: Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"]
+    output_dir: str
+    generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    inventory: dict[str, Any]
+    evidence: list[Evidence] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    mutations_performed: bool = False
 
 
-class AgentComplianceAuditorResult(dict[str, Any]):
-    """Compact JSON-shaped result alias for a smaller Agent Card output schema."""
+class FindingResult(StrictModel):
+    audit_id: str
+    target: AuditTarget
+    status: Literal["ok", "partial", "setup_required"]
+    output_dir: str
+    generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    findings: list[Finding]
+    evidence: list[Evidence] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    mutations_performed: bool = False
 
 
+class RiskSummaryResult(StrictModel):
+    audit_id: str
+    target: AuditTarget
+    status: Literal["ok", "partial"]
+    output_dir: str
+    generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    risk_summary: dict[str, Any]
+    findings: list[Finding]
+    warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    mutations_performed: bool = False
+
+
+class RemediationResult(StrictModel):
+    audit_id: str
+    target: AuditTarget
+    status: Literal["ok", "partial"]
+    output_dir: str
+    generated_files: list[OutputFile] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    remediation_markdown: str
+    sarif: dict[str, Any]
+    warnings: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list)
+    mutations_performed: bool = False
 
 
 class AgentComplianceAuditorConfig(StrictModel):
@@ -224,101 +209,16 @@ class AgentComplianceAuditorConfig(StrictModel):
     default_allowed_namespaces: list[str] = Field(default_factory=list, max_length=50)
 
 
-def _tool_schema(kind: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    request_schema: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "type": "object",
-        "additionalProperties": False,
-        "properties": {
-            "target": {
-                "type": "object",
-                "additionalProperties": False,
-                "properties": {
-                    "agent_name": {"type": "string", "minLength": 1, "maxLength": 128, "pattern": "^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{0,127}$"},
-                    "agent_url": {"type": ["string", "null"], "format": "uri"},
-                    "repository": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 256},
-                    "namespace": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 128},
-                    "deployment": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 128},
-                },
-                "required": ["agent_name"],
-            },
-            "options": {
-                "type": "object",
-                "additionalProperties": False,
-                "properties": {
-                    "audit_id": {"type": ["string", "null"], "maxLength": 80, "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9_.-]+$"},
-                    "max_files": {"type": "integer", "minimum": 0, "maximum": MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT, "default": 40},
-                    "probe_mode": {"type": "string", "enum": ["none", "health_only", "synthetic"], "default": "health_only"},
-                    "include_repository": {"type": "boolean", "default": True},
-                    "include_runtime": {"type": "boolean", "default": True},
-                    "include_remediation": {"type": "boolean", "default": True},
-                    "allowed_hosts": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}, "maxItems": 20, "default": []},
-                    "allowed_namespaces": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}, "maxItems": 20, "default": []},
-                },
-            },
-        },
-        "required": ["target"],
-    }
-    if kind in {"configuration", "runtime", "risk"}:
-        request_schema["properties"]["inventory"] = {"type": ["object", "null"], "additionalProperties": True}
-    finding_schema = {
-        "type": "object",
-        "additionalProperties": False,
-        "properties": {
-            "id": {"type": "string"},
-            "control_id": {"type": "string"},
-            "title": {"type": "string"},
-            "severity": {"type": "string", "enum": ["critical", "high", "medium", "low", "info"]},
-            "confidence": {"type": "string", "enum": ["high", "medium", "low"]},
-            "status": {"type": "string", "enum": ["open", "passed", "unknown", "not_tested"], "default": "open"},
-            "evidence_refs": {"type": "array", "items": {"type": "string"}, "maxItems": 20, "default": []},
-            "impact": {"type": "string"},
-            "remediation": {"type": "string"},
-            "verification_procedure": {"type": "string"},
-        },
-        "required": ["id", "control_id", "title", "severity", "confidence", "impact", "remediation", "verification_procedure"],
-    }
-    if kind == "risk":
-        request_schema["properties"]["configuration_findings"] = {"type": "array", "items": finding_schema, "maxItems": MAX_FINDINGS, "default": []}
-        request_schema["properties"]["runtime_findings"] = {"type": "array", "items": finding_schema, "maxItems": MAX_FINDINGS, "default": []}
-    if kind == "remediation":
-        request_schema["properties"]["findings"] = {"type": "array", "items": finding_schema, "maxItems": MAX_FINDINGS, "default": []}
-        request_schema["properties"]["risk_summary"] = {"type": ["object", "null"], "additionalProperties": True}
-    return {"type": "object", "additionalProperties": False, "properties": {"request": request_schema}, "required": ["request"]}
-
-
 class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, NoAuth]):
     name = "agent-compliance-auditor"
-    description = (
-        "Read-only compliance auditor for deployed A2A agents and repositories. "
-        "Produces bounded evidence, stable findings, risk summaries, and remediation artifacts."
-    )
+    description = "Read-only compliance auditor for deployed A2A agents and repositories."
     version = "0.1.0"
-
     config_model = AgentComplianceAuditorConfig
     auth_model = NoAuth
-    pricing = Pricing(
-        price_per_call_usd=0.0,
-        caller_pays_llm=False,
-        notes="Deterministic read-only auditing; no LLM calls and no production mutations.",
-    )
+    pricing = Pricing(price_per_call_usd=0.0, caller_pays_llm=False, notes="Deterministic read-only auditing; no LLM calls and no production mutations.")
     resources = Resources(cpu="500m", memory="512Mi", max_runtime_seconds=900)
-    workspace_access = WorkspaceAccess.dynamic(
-        max_files=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT + 10,
-        allowed_modes=(WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY, WorkspaceMode.READ_WRITE_OVERLAY),
-        require_reason=False,
-        deny_patterns=DENIED_REPO_GLOBS,
-        max_total_size_bytes=12 * 1024 * 1024,
-    )
-    egress = EgressPolicy(
-        allow_hosts=(
-            "gitea.a2a.svc.cluster.local",
-            "argocd-server.argocd.svc.cluster.local",
-            "kubernetes.default.svc",
-            "registry-1.docker.io",
-            "ghcr.io",
-        ),
-        deny_internet_by_default=True,
-    )
+    workspace_access = WorkspaceAccess.dynamic(max_files=MAX_FILES_PER_AUDIT + 10, allowed_modes=(WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY, WorkspaceMode.READ_WRITE_OVERLAY), require_reason=False, deny_patterns=DENIED_REPO_GLOBS, max_total_size_bytes=12 * 1024 * 1024)
+    egress = EgressPolicy(allow_hosts=("gitea.a2a.svc.cluster.local", "argocd-server.argocd.svc.cluster.local", "kubernetes.default.svc", "registry-1.docker.io", "ghcr.io"), deny_internet_by_default=True)
     tools_used = ("httpx", "pydantic", "workspace")
     consumer_setup = ConsumerSetup.from_fields(
         ConsumerSetupField.config("GITEA_BASE_URL", label="Gitea base URL", required=False, input_type="url"),
@@ -331,13 +231,13 @@ class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, NoAuth]):
         ConsumerSetupField.secret("REGISTRY_TOKEN", label="Registry read-only token", required=False),
     )
 
-    @a2a.tool(description="Inventory a deployed A2A agent card, repository evidence, manifests, exposure, provenance, resources, and health", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only", input_schema=_tool_schema("inventory"))
-    async def inventory_agent(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: InventoryRequest) -> Any:
+    @a2a.tool(description="Inventory a deployed A2A agent card, repository evidence, manifests, exposure, provenance, resources, and health", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
+    async def inventory_agent(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: InventoryRequest) -> InventoryResult:
         audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="inventory_agent", target=request.target.agent_name)
         inventory, evidence, warnings, status = await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id)
         output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
-        files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"inventory.json": inventory}, warnings)
+        files = await _write_outputs(ctx, output_dir, {"inventory.json": inventory}, warnings)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="inventory_agent", findings=0)
         return InventoryResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status=status, output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, inventory=inventory, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
 
@@ -347,45 +247,45 @@ class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, NoAuth]):
         await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_configuration", target=request.target.agent_name)
         inventory = request.inventory or (await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id))[0]
         findings, evidence, warnings = _configuration_findings(request.target, inventory)
-        findings = _dedupe_findings(findings)
+        findings = _dedupe(findings)
         output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
-        files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
+        files = await _write_outputs(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_configuration", findings=len(findings))
-        return {"audit_id": audit_id, "target": _dump(request.target), "status": "ok", "output_dir": output_dir, "generated_files": [_dump(f) for f in files], "findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings], "evidence": [_dump(e) for e in evidence], "warnings": warnings, "mutations_performed": False}
+        return FindingResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, findings=findings, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
 
     @a2a.tool(description="Run bounded non-destructive runtime probes and audit deployment health without mutations", timeout_seconds=180, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
     async def audit_runtime(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: AuditRuntimeRequest) -> FindingResult:
         audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_runtime", target=request.target.agent_name)
         inventory = request.inventory or (await _collect_inventory(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, audit_id))[0]
-        findings, evidence, warnings = await _runtime_findings(self, ctx, request.target, request.options, inventory)
-        findings = _dedupe_findings(findings)
+        findings, evidence, warnings = _runtime_findings(request.target, inventory)
+        findings = _dedupe(findings)
         output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
-        files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
+        files = await _write_outputs(ctx, output_dir, {"findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings]}}, warnings)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="audit_runtime", findings=len(findings))
-        return {"audit_id": audit_id, "target": _dump(request.target), "status": "ok", "output_dir": output_dir, "generated_files": [_dump(f) for f in files], "findings": [_dump(f) for f in findings], "evidence": [_dump(e) for e in evidence], "warnings": warnings, "mutations_performed": False}
+        return FindingResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, findings=findings, evidence=evidence, warnings=warnings)
 
     @a2a.tool(description="Deduplicate findings, map evidence to controls, and score severity, confidence, and aggregate risk", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
     async def assess_risk(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: AssessRiskRequest) -> RiskSummaryResult:
         audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="assess_risk", target=request.target.agent_name)
-        all_findings = _dedupe_findings([*request.configuration_findings, *request.runtime_findings])
+        all_findings = _dedupe([*request.configuration_findings, *request.runtime_findings])
         summary = _risk_summary(all_findings)
         output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
-        files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"risk-summary.json": summary, "findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in all_findings]}}, [])
+        files = await _write_outputs(ctx, output_dir, {"risk-summary.json": summary, "findings.json": {"findings": [_dump(f) for f in all_findings]}}, [])
         await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="assess_risk", findings=len(all_findings), score=summary["risk_score"])
-        return {"audit_id": audit_id, "target": _dump(request.target), "status": "ok", "output_dir": output_dir, "generated_files": [_dump(f) for f in files], "risk_summary": summary, "findings": [_dump(f) for f in all_findings], "warnings": [], "mutations_performed": False}
+        return RiskSummaryResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, risk_summary=summary, findings=all_findings)
 
-    @a2a.tool(description="Generate actionable remediation and a machine-readable SARIF report for compliance findings", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only", input_schema=_tool_schema("remediation"))
-    async def generate_remediation(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: GenerateRemediationRequest) -> Any:
+    @a2a.tool(description="Generate actionable remediation and a machine-readable SARIF report for compliance findings", timeout_seconds=120, idempotent=True, cost_class="read-only")
+    async def generate_remediation(self, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], request: GenerateRemediationRequest) -> RemediationResult:
         audit_id = _audit_id(request.target, request.options.audit_id)
         await _event(ctx, "audit_started", audit_id=audit_id, skill="generate_remediation", target=request.target.agent_name)
-        findings = _dedupe_findings(request.findings)
+        findings = _dedupe(request.findings)
         risk_summary = request.risk_summary or _risk_summary(findings)
-        markdown = _remediation_markdown(request.target, audit_id, findings, risk_summary)
+        markdown = _remediation_md(request.target, audit_id, findings, risk_summary)
         sarif = _sarif(request.target, findings)
         output_dir = _output_dir(audit_id)
-        files = await _write_json_bundle(ctx, output_dir, {"remediation.md": markdown, "sarif.json": sarif, "risk-summary.json": risk_summary}, [])
+        files = await _write_outputs(ctx, output_dir, {"remediation.md": markdown, "sarif.json": sarif, "risk-summary.json": risk_summary}, [])
         await _event(ctx, "audit_completed", audit_id=audit_id, skill="generate_remediation", findings=len(findings))
         return RemediationResult(audit_id=audit_id, target=request.target, status="ok", output_dir=output_dir, generated_files=files, remediation_markdown=markdown, sarif=sarif)
 
@@ -393,222 +293,164 @@ class AgentComplianceAuditor(A2AAgent[AgentComplianceAuditorConfig, NoAuth]):
 async def _collect_inventory(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], target: AuditTarget, options: AuditOptions, audit_id: str) -> tuple[dict[str, Any], list[Evidence], list[str], Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"]]:
     warnings: list[str] = []
     evidence: list[Evidence] = []
-    status: Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"] = "ok"
-    allowed_hosts = _allowed_hosts(agent, options)
-    allowed_namespaces = _allowed_namespaces(agent, options)
-    await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="resolve_identity")
-    identity = {
-        "agent_name": target.agent_name,
-        "agent_url": str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None,
-        "repository": target.repository,
-        "namespace": target.namespace,
-        "deployment": target.deployment,
-        "authorized": _namespace_allowed(target.namespace, allowed_namespaces),
-    }
-    if not identity["authorized"]:
-        status = "partial"
+    allowed_hosts = {h.lower().strip() for h in [*agent.config.default_allowed_hosts, *options.allowed_hosts] if h.strip()}
+    allowed_namespaces = {n.strip() for n in [*agent.config.default_allowed_namespaces, *options.allowed_namespaces] if n.strip()}
+    authorized = not allowed_namespaces or bool(target.namespace and target.namespace in allowed_namespaces)
+    status: Literal["ok", "partial", "unreachable", "setup_required"] = "ok" if authorized else "partial"
+    if not authorized:
         warnings.append("Target namespace is outside the configured allowlist; runtime probes skipped.")
-
     await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="agent_card")
-    card = await _fetch_agent_card(ctx, str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
-    if card.get("status") == "unreachable":
-        status = "unreachable" if status == "ok" else status
+    card = await _fetch_card(str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
+    if card.get("status") == "unreachable" and status == "ok":
+        status = "unreachable"
     evidence.append(_evidence("card", "agent_card", "observed" if card.get("card") else "unknown", card))
-
     await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="repository_static_inspection")
-    repo_files = await _read_workspace_repo(ctx, options.max_files if options.include_repository else 0, warnings)
-    repo_summary = _summarize_repo(repo_files)
+    repo_files = await _read_repo(ctx, options.max_files if options.include_repository else 0, warnings)
     evidence.extend(_repo_evidence(repo_files))
-
-    manifests = _extract_manifests(repo_files)
-    skills = _extract_skills(card.get("card"), repo_files)
-    secrets = _detect_secret_references(repo_files)
-    exposure = _extract_exposure(card.get("card"), manifests)
-    resources = _extract_resources(card.get("card"), manifests)
-    provenance = _extract_provenance(manifests, repo_files)
-    rbac = _extract_rbac(manifests)
-
+    manifests = _manifests(repo_files)
     health = {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "probe_mode is none"}
-    if options.probe_mode is not ProbeMode.NONE and identity["authorized"]:
+    if options.probe_mode is not ProbeMode.NONE and authorized:
         await _event(ctx, "audit_progress", audit_id=audit_id, phase="bounded_runtime_probe")
-        health = await _health_probe(str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
-
+        health = await _health(str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, allowed_hosts, warnings)
     inventory = {
         "schema_version": "2026-07-13",
         "audit_id": audit_id,
         "generated_at": datetime.now(UTC).isoformat(),
-        "identity": identity,
+        "identity": {"agent_name": target.agent_name, "agent_url": str(target.agent_url) if target.agent_url else None, "repository": target.repository, "namespace": target.namespace, "deployment": target.deployment, "authorized": authorized},
         "agent_card": card,
-        "skills": skills,
-        "schemas": _extract_schemas(card.get("card")),
+        "skills": _skills(card.get("card"), repo_files),
+        "schemas": _schemas(card.get("card")),
         "manifests": manifests,
-        "rbac": rbac,
-        "secrets_references": secrets,
-        "network_exposure": exposure,
-        "image_provenance": provenance,
-        "resource_limits": resources,
+        "rbac": _rbac(manifests),
+        "secrets_references": _secret_refs(repo_files),
+        "network_exposure": _exposure(manifests),
+        "image_provenance": _provenance(manifests, repo_files),
+        "resource_limits": _resources(card.get("card"), manifests),
         "deployment_health": health,
-        "repository": repo_summary,
-        "controls": _controls_catalog(),
+        "repository": _repo_summary(repo_files),
+        "controls": _controls(),
         "unknowns": _unknowns(card, manifests, health, repo_files),
         "mutations_performed": False,
     }
     return inventory, evidence, warnings, status
 
 
-async def _fetch_agent_card(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+async def _fetch_card(agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     if not agent_url:
         return {"status": "unknown", "reason": "agent_url not provided"}
     parsed = urlparse(agent_url)
-    if not _safe_http_url(parsed, allowed_hosts):
+    if not _safe_url(parsed, allowed_hosts):
         warnings.append("Agent URL host is not allowlisted or is unsafe; card fetch skipped.")
         return {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "host_not_allowlisted"}
-    url = agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/.well-known/agent-card"
     try:
         async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), follow_redirects=False) as client:
-            resp = await client.get(url, headers={"accept": "application/json"})
+            resp = await client.get(agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/.well-known/agent-card", headers={"accept": "application/json"})
         if resp.status_code >= 400:
             return {"status": "unreachable", "http_status": resp.status_code, "body_excerpt": _redact(resp.text[:500])}
-        data = _bounded_json(resp.text, warnings)
-        return {"status": "ok", "url": url, "card": data}
+        return {"status": "ok", "card": _bounded_json(resp.text, warnings)}
     except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
         warnings.append(f"Agent card fetch failed: {type(exc).__name__}")
         return {"status": "unreachable", "error_type": type(exc).__name__}
 
 
-async def _health_probe(agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+async def _health(agent_url: str | None, allowed_hosts: set[str], warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     if not agent_url:
         return {"status": "unknown", "reason": "agent_url not provided"}
-    parsed = urlparse(agent_url)
-    if not _safe_http_url(parsed, allowed_hosts):
+    if not _safe_url(urlparse(agent_url), allowed_hosts):
         return {"status": "not_tested", "reason": "host_not_allowlisted"}
-    url = agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/healthz"
     started = time.perf_counter()
     try:
         async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=httpx.Timeout(HTTP_TIMEOUT_SECONDS), follow_redirects=False) as client:
-            resp = await client.get(url)
+            resp = await client.get(agent_url.rstrip("/") + "/healthz")
         return {"status": "ok" if resp.status_code < 500 else "degraded", "http_status": resp.status_code, "latency_ms": round((time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000, 2)}
     except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
         warnings.append(f"Health probe failed: {type(exc).__name__}")
         return {"status": "unreachable", "error_type": type(exc).__name__}
 
 
-async def _read_workspace_repo(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], max_files: int, warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
+async def _read_repo(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], max_files: int, warnings: list[str]) -> dict[str, str]:
     if max_files <= 0:
         return {}
     try:
-        view = await ctx.workspace.open_view(
-            purpose="Read-only static inspection of A2A agent source files",
-            hints=("agent.py a2a.yaml requirements README tests skills",),
-            file_types=(FileType.PYTHON, FileType.YAML, FileType.JSON, FileType.MARKDOWN, FileType.TOML),
-            max_files=max_files,
-            mode=WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY,
-            reason="Compliance audit reads bounded source files and never writes repository paths.",
-        )
+        view = await ctx.workspace.open_view(purpose="Read-only static inspection of A2A agent source files", hints=("agent.py a2a.yaml requirements README tests skills",), file_types=(FileType.PYTHON, FileType.YAML, FileType.JSON, FileType.MARKDOWN, FileType.TOML), max_files=max_files, mode=WorkspaceMode.READ_ONLY, reason="Compliance audit reads bounded source files and never writes repository paths.")
     except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
         warnings.append(f"Repository workspace unavailable: {type(exc).__name__}")
         return {}
     files: dict[str, str] = {}
     for match in view.files[:max_files]:
-        path = match.path.replace("\\", "/")
-        if not _repo_path_allowed(path):
+        path = match.path.replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
+        if not _path_allowed(path):
             continue
         try:
-            raw = await view.read(path)
+            files[path] = (await view.read(path))[:MAX_TEXT_BYTES].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
         except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
             warnings.append(f"Could not read {path}: {type(exc).__name__}")
-            continue
-        files[path] = raw[:MAX_TEXT_BYTES].decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
     return files
 
 
-async def _write_json_bundle(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], output_dir: str, files: dict[str, Any], warnings: list[str]) -> list[OutputFile]:
+async def _write_outputs(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], output_dir: str, files: dict[str, Any], warnings: list[str]) -> list[OutputFile]:
     out: list[OutputFile] = []
     for name, payload in files.items():
         rel = f"{output_dir}/{name}"
-        if name.endswith(".md") and isinstance(payload, str):
-            data = payload.encode("utf-8")
-            mime = "text/markdown"
-        else:
-            data = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode("utf-8")
-            mime = "application/json"
-        artifact_uri: str | None = None
+        data = payload.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(payload, str) else json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str).encode("utf-8")
+        mime = "text/markdown" if name.endswith(".md") else "application/json"
+        uri = None
         try:
             ref = await ctx.write_artifact(rel, data, mime)
             await ctx.emit_artifact(ref)
-            artifact_uri = ref.uri
+            uri = ref.uri
         except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
             warnings.append(f"Artifact write failed for {rel}: {type(exc).__name__}")
-        try:
-            ws = ctx.workspace
-            if getattr(ws, "is_writable_output", lambda _p: False)(rel) and hasattr(ws, "write_bytes"):
-                ws.write_bytes(rel, data)
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-        out.append(OutputFile(path=rel, artifact_uri=artifact_uri, mime_type=mime, size_bytes=len(data)))
+        out.append(OutputFile(path=rel, artifact_uri=uri, mime_type=mime, size_bytes=len(data)))
     return out
 
 
 def _configuration_findings(target: AuditTarget, inventory: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Evidence], list[str]]:
     findings: list[Finding] = []
-    evidence: list[Evidence] = []
-    warnings: list[str] = []
     card = (inventory.get("agent_card") or {}).get("card") or {}
-    repo = inventory.get("repository") or {}
-    resources = inventory.get("resource_limits") or {}
-    secrets = inventory.get("secrets_references") or []
-    exposure = inventory.get("network_exposure") or {}
     skills = inventory.get("skills") or []
-
     if not card:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-CARD-001", "Agent Card could not be verified", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "card", "Consumers cannot validate skills, schemas, runtime, or billing metadata.", "Ensure /.well-known/agent-card is reachable over an approved host and returns a valid A2A Card.", "Fetch /.well-known/agent-card and validate that all public skills and runtime metadata are present."))
-    if len(skills) == 0:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-001", "No public skills discovered", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "skills", "Callers cannot rely on a stable typed API contract.", "Expose typed @a2a.tool methods with Pydantic-compatible input and output schemas.", "Reload the live Agent Card and confirm skills[].input_schema and output_schema are non-null."))
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-CARD-001", "Agent Card could not be verified", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "card", "Consumers cannot validate skills, schemas, runtime, or billing metadata.", "Ensure /.well-known/agent-card is reachable over an approved host and returns a valid A2A Card.", "Fetch /.well-known/agent-card and validate metadata."))
+    if not skills:
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-001", "No public skills discovered", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.MEDIUM, "skills", "Callers cannot rely on a stable typed API contract.", "Expose typed @a2a.tool methods with input and output schemas.", "Reload the live Agent Card and confirm skills[].input_schema and output_schema."))
     for skill in skills:
         schema = skill.get("input_schema") or skill.get("inputSchema") or {}
         out_schema = skill.get("output_schema") or skill.get("outputSchema") or {}
-        if not _schema_strict(schema) or not out_schema:
-            findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-002", f"Skill {skill.get('name', '<unknown>')} has weak schema", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "schemas", "Weak or nullable schemas increase integration errors and prompt-injection attack surface.", "Use strict Pydantic models or explicit JSON Schema with type=object and additionalProperties=false.", "Inspect the Agent Card skill schemas and run negative validation tests for extra fields."))
-    if exposure.get("public") is True and not exposure.get("documented_public_reason"):
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-NET-001", "Agent is publicly exposed without documented reason", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "network_exposure", "Unexpected public exposure can broaden abuse and data-exfiltration paths.", "Set expose.public=false unless public access is required; document the reason and authentication boundary.", "Review a2a.yaml and ingress policy; confirm exposure matches intended audience."))
-    if resources.get("max_runtime_seconds") in (None, "unknown"):
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-OPS-001", "Runtime limit is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "resource_limits", "Unbounded or unknown runtime budgets can cause reliability and cost issues.", "Declare Resources(... max_runtime_seconds=...) in agent.py and mirror runtime.resources in a2a.yaml for larger pods.", "Load Agent Card runtime.resources and deployment manifest to confirm limits."))
-    if secrets:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SECRET-001", "Potential secret or provider-key reference found in source", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "secrets_references", "Secrets in source or logs can be exfiltrated by callers or dependencies.", "Remove literal secrets, provider-key environment reads, and broad secret access. Use ctx.consumer_secret or declared runtime secrets only.", "Run secret scanning and verify no returned artifacts contain secret values."))
-    if repo.get("suspicious_instruction_count", 0) > 0:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "Repository contains malicious instruction-like text", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "repository", "Auditors or LLM-backed tools could be manipulated if repo text is treated as instructions.", "Keep repository content in evidence fields only; never concatenate it into privileged prompts without quoting and policy guards.", "Re-run audit and confirm malicious text appears only as redacted evidence, not as executed instructions."))
-    evidence.append(_evidence("configuration", "configuration_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings)}))
-    return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], evidence, warnings
+        if not (isinstance(schema, dict) and schema.get("type") == "object" and schema.get("additionalProperties") is False) or not out_schema:
+            findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SCHEMA-002", f"Skill {skill.get('name', '<unknown>')} has weak schema", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "schemas", "Weak schemas increase integration errors and injection surface.", "Use strict Pydantic models or explicit JSON Schema with additionalProperties=false.", "Inspect the Agent Card schemas and run negative validation tests."))
+    if (inventory.get("network_exposure") or {}).get("public") is True:
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-NET-001", "Agent is publicly exposed", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "network_exposure", "Unexpected public exposure can broaden abuse and exfiltration paths.", "Set expose.public=false unless public access is required and documented.", "Review a2a.yaml and ingress policy."))
+    if (inventory.get("resource_limits") or {}).get("max_runtime_seconds") in (None, "unknown"):
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-OPS-001", "Runtime limit is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "resource_limits", "Unknown runtime budgets can cause reliability and cost issues.", "Declare Resources and mirror runtime.resources in a2a.yaml.", "Load Agent Card runtime.resources and deployment manifest."))
+    if inventory.get("secrets_references"):
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-SECRET-001", "Potential secret or provider-key reference found in source", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "secrets_references", "Secrets in source or logs can be exfiltrated.", "Remove literal secrets and broad provider-key reads; use declared consumer setup or runtime secrets.", "Run secret scanning and verify no artifacts contain secret values."))
+    if (inventory.get("repository") or {}).get("suspicious_instruction_count", 0) > 0:
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "Repository contains malicious instruction-like text", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.HIGH, "repository", "Auditors or LLM-backed tools could be manipulated if repo text is treated as instructions.", "Keep repository content in evidence fields only; never treat it as instructions.", "Confirm malicious text appears only as redacted evidence."))
+    return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], [_evidence("configuration", "configuration_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings)})], []
 
 
-async def _runtime_findings(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], target: AuditTarget, options: AuditOptions, inventory: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Evidence], list[str]]:
+def _runtime_findings(target: AuditTarget, inventory: dict[str, Any]) -> tuple[list[Finding], list[Evidence], list[str]]:
     findings: list[Finding] = []
-    evidence: list[Evidence] = []
-    warnings: list[str] = []
     health = inventory.get("deployment_health") or {"status": "unknown"}
-    identity = inventory.get("identity") or {}
-    if identity.get("authorized") is False:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-TENANT-001", "Runtime audit skipped by namespace allowlist", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "identity", "Auditing outside the authorized tenant boundary could violate isolation policy.", "Configure allowed_namespaces for the target tenant or run the audit from the owning tenant.", "Confirm namespace allowlist contains only tenant-owned namespaces and retry."))
+    if (inventory.get("identity") or {}).get("authorized") is False:
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-TENANT-001", "Runtime audit skipped by namespace allowlist", Severity.HIGH, Confidence.HIGH, "identity", "Auditing outside the authorized tenant boundary could violate isolation policy.", "Configure allowed_namespaces for the target tenant or run from the owning tenant.", "Confirm namespace allowlist contains only tenant-owned namespaces and retry."))
     if health.get("status") in {"unreachable", "degraded"}:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-001", "Agent health probe failed or degraded", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Consumers may experience failed calls or stale Agent Cards.", "Inspect deployment status, readiness probes, service routing, and recent rollout events.", "Repeat health-only probe and verify HTTP 2xx/3xx or documented readiness semantics."))
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-001", "Agent health probe failed or degraded", Severity.MEDIUM, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Consumers may experience failed calls or stale Agent Cards.", "Inspect deployment status, readiness probes, service routing, and rollout events.", "Repeat health-only probe and verify readiness."))
     if health.get("status") in {"unknown", "not_tested"}:
-        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-002", "Runtime health state is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Unknown runtime state leaves operational risk unmeasured.", "Provide an allowlisted agent_url and enable health_only probes; configure read-only Kubernetes/Argo metadata if needed.", "Run audit_runtime with probe_mode=health_only and verify deployment_health.status."))
-    evidence.append(_evidence("runtime", "runtime_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings), "health": health}))
-    return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], evidence, warnings
+        findings.append(_finding(target, "A2A-HEALTH-002", "Runtime health state is unknown", Severity.LOW, Confidence.MEDIUM, "deployment_health", "Unknown runtime state leaves operational risk unmeasured.", "Provide an allowlisted agent_url and enable health_only probes.", "Run audit_runtime with probe_mode=health_only."))
+    return findings[:MAX_FINDINGS], [_evidence("runtime", "runtime_rules", "observed", {"finding_count": len(findings), "health": health})], []
 
 
 def _finding(target: AuditTarget, control_id: str, title: str, severity: Severity, confidence: Confidence, evidence_ref: str, impact: str, remediation: str, verification: str) -> Finding:
-    base = f"{target.agent_name}|{control_id}|{title}"
-    suffix = hashlib.sha256(base.encode()).hexdigest()[:10]
+    suffix = hashlib.sha256(f"{target.agent_name}|{control_id}|{title}".encode()).hexdigest()[:10]
     return Finding(id=f"{control_id.lower()}-{suffix}", control_id=control_id, title=title, severity=severity, confidence=confidence, evidence_refs=[evidence_ref], impact=impact, remediation=remediation, verification_procedure=verification)
 
 
-def _dedupe_findings(findings: list[Finding]) -> list[Finding]:
-    seen: dict[str, Finding] = {}
+def _dedupe(findings: list[Finding]) -> list[Finding]:
     rank = {Severity.CRITICAL: 5, Severity.HIGH: 4, Severity.MEDIUM: 3, Severity.LOW: 2, Severity.INFO: 1}
+    seen: dict[str, Finding] = {}
     for f in findings:
-        prev = seen.get(f.id)
-        if prev is None or rank[f.severity] > rank[prev.severity]:
+        if f.id not in seen or rank[f.severity] > rank[seen[f.id].severity]:
             seen[f.id] = f
     return sorted(seen.values(), key=lambda f: (-rank[f.severity], f.control_id, f.id))[:MAX_FINDINGS]
 
@@ -621,128 +463,86 @@ def _risk_summary(findings: list[Finding]) -> dict[str, Any]:
         counts[f.severity.value] += 1
         score += weights[f.severity]
     score = min(score, 100)
-    if counts["critical"]:
-        rating = "critical"
-    elif score >= 70:
-        rating = "high"
-    elif score >= 30:
-        rating = "medium"
-    elif score > 0:
-        rating = "low"
-    else:
-        rating = "clean"
+    rating = "critical" if counts["critical"] else "high" if score >= 70 else "medium" if score >= 30 else "low" if score else "clean"
     return {"schema_version": "2026-07-13", "risk_score": score, "risk_rating": rating, "finding_counts": counts, "top_controls": sorted({f.control_id for f in findings})[:20], "unknown_or_not_tested": [f.control_id for f in findings if f.status in {"unknown", "not_tested"}], "mutations_performed": False}
 
 
-def _remediation_markdown(target: AuditTarget, audit_id: str, findings: list[Finding], risk_summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    lines = [f"# Remediation plan for {target.agent_name}", "", f"Audit ID: `{audit_id}`", f"Risk rating: **{risk_summary.get('risk_rating', 'unknown')}** ({risk_summary.get('risk_score', 0)}/100)", "", "This plan is read-only output. No production systems or repositories were changed.", ""]
+def _remediation_md(target: AuditTarget, audit_id: str, findings: list[Finding], summary: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    lines = [f"# Remediation plan for {target.agent_name}", "", f"Audit ID: `{audit_id}`", f"Risk rating: **{summary.get('risk_rating', 'unknown')}** ({summary.get('risk_score', 0)}/100)", "", "This plan is read-only output. No production systems or repositories were changed.", ""]
     if not findings:
-        lines.extend(["## No open findings", "", "The synthetic audit found no policy violations in the supplied evidence. Unknown/not-tested areas should still be reviewed."])
+        lines += ["## No open findings", "", "The synthetic audit found no policy violations in the supplied evidence. Unknown/not-tested areas should still be reviewed."]
     for f in findings:
-        lines.extend([f"## {f.severity.value.upper()} — {f.title}", "", f"- Finding ID: `{f.id}`", f"- Control: `{f.control_id}`", f"- Confidence: `{f.confidence.value}`", f"- Evidence references: {', '.join(f.evidence_refs) or 'none'}", f"- Impact: {f.impact}", f"- Remediation: {f.remediation}", f"- Verification: {f.verification_procedure}", ""])
+        lines += [f"## {f.severity.value.upper()} — {f.title}", "", f"- Finding ID: `{f.id}`", f"- Control: `{f.control_id}`", f"- Confidence: `{f.confidence.value}`", f"- Evidence references: {', '.join(f.evidence_refs) or 'none'}", f"- Impact: {f.impact}", f"- Remediation: {f.remediation}", f"- Verification: {f.verification_procedure}", ""]
     return "\n".join(lines)
 
 
 def _sarif(target: AuditTarget, findings: list[Finding]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    rules = []
-    results = []
-    for f in findings:
-        rules.append({"id": f.control_id, "name": f.title, "shortDescription": {"text": f.title}, "help": {"text": f.remediation}})
-        results.append({"ruleId": f.control_id, "level": _sarif_level(f.severity), "message": {"text": f"{f.title}: {f.impact}"}, "partialFingerprints": {"findingId": f.id}, "properties": {"severity": f.severity.value, "confidence": f.confidence.value, "verification": f.verification_procedure}})
-    return {"version": "2.1.0", "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/sarif-2.1.0.json", "runs": [{"tool": {"driver": {"name": "agent-compliance-auditor", "informationUri": "https://docs.a2acloud.io/", "rules": rules}}, "invocations": [{"executionSuccessful": True, "properties": {"target": target.agent_name, "mutations_performed": False}}], "results": results}]}
+    rules = [{"id": f.control_id, "name": f.title, "shortDescription": {"text": f.title}, "help": {"text": f.remediation}} for f in findings]
+    results = [{"ruleId": f.control_id, "level": "error" if f.severity in {Severity.CRITICAL, Severity.HIGH} else "warning" if f.severity is Severity.MEDIUM else "note", "message": {"text": f"{f.title}: {f.impact}"}, "partialFingerprints": {"findingId": f.id}, "properties": {"severity": f.severity.value, "confidence": f.confidence.value, "verification": f.verification_procedure}} for f in findings]
+    return {"version": "2.1.0", "$schema": "https://json.schemastore.org/sarif-2.1.0.json", "runs": [{"tool": {"driver": {"name": "agent-compliance-auditor", "rules": rules}}, "invocations": [{"executionSuccessful": True, "properties": {"target": target.agent_name, "mutations_performed": False}}], "results": results}]}
 
 
-def _sarif_level(severity: Severity) -> str:
-    return {Severity.CRITICAL: "error", Severity.HIGH: "error", Severity.MEDIUM: "warning", Severity.LOW: "note", Severity.INFO: "none"}[severity]
+def _repo_summary(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    suspicious_paths = [p for p, t in files.items() if any(tok in t.lower() for tok in ("ignore previous instructions", "exfiltrate", "send secrets", "system prompt"))]
+    return {"files_inspected": len(files), "paths": sorted(files), "suspicious_instruction_count": len(suspicious_paths), "suspicious_instruction_paths": suspicious_paths[:20], "bounded_bytes_per_file": MAX_TEXT_BYTES}
 
 
-def _summarize_repo(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    suspicious = 0
-    indicators: list[str] = []
-    for path, text in files.items():
-        lower = text.lower()
-        if any(token in lower for token in ("ignore previous instructions", "exfiltrate", "send secrets", "system prompt")):
-            suspicious += 1
-            indicators.append(path)
-    return {"files_inspected": len(files), "paths": sorted(files), "suspicious_instruction_count": suspicious, "suspicious_instruction_paths": indicators[:20], "bounded_bytes_per_file": MAX_TEXT_BYTES}
+def _manifests(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    return {path: ({"present": True, "sha256": _sha(files[path]), "excerpt": _redact(files[path][:1200])} if path in files else {"present": False}) for path in ("a2a.yaml", "agent.py", "requirements.txt", "Dockerfile")}
 
 
-def _extract_manifests(files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    manifests: dict[str, Any] = {}
-    for path in ("a2a.yaml", "agent.py", "requirements.txt", "Dockerfile"):
-        if path in files:
-            manifests[path] = {"present": True, "sha256": _sha(files[path]), "excerpt": _redact(files[path][:1200])}
-        else:
-            manifests[path] = {"present": False}
-    return manifests
+def _skills(card: Any, files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
+    if isinstance(card, dict) and isinstance(card.get("skills"), list):
+        return [s for s in card["skills"] if isinstance(s, dict)]
+    return [{"name": n, "source": "agent.py"} for n in re.findall(r"async\s+def\s+([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\s*\(", files.get("agent.py", ""))]
 
 
-def _extract_skills(card: Any, files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    if isinstance(card, dict):
-        skills = card.get("skills") or []
-        if isinstance(skills, list):
-            return [s for s in skills if isinstance(s, dict)]
-    text = files.get("agent.py", "")
-    names = re.findall(r"async\s+def\s+([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)\s*\(", text)
-    return [{"name": n, "source": "agent.py"} for n in names]
-
-
-def _extract_schemas(card: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    schemas: dict[str, Any] = {}
+def _schemas(card: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    out: dict[str, Any] = {}
     if isinstance(card, dict):
         for skill in card.get("skills") or []:
             if isinstance(skill, dict):
-                name = str(skill.get("name") or skill.get("id") or "unknown")
-                schemas[name] = {"input_schema": skill.get("input_schema") or skill.get("inputSchema"), "output_schema": skill.get("output_schema") or skill.get("outputSchema")}
-    return schemas
+                out[str(skill.get("name") or skill.get("id") or "unknown")] = {"input_schema": skill.get("input_schema") or skill.get("inputSchema"), "output_schema": skill.get("output_schema") or skill.get("outputSchema")}
+    return out
 
 
-def _detect_secret_references(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
+def _secret_refs(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    refs: list[dict[str, str]] = []
     for path, text in files.items():
         for pattern in SECRET_PATTERNS:
-            for match in pattern.finditer(text):
-                out.append({"path": path, "match": _redact(match.group(0))})
-        for indicator in WRITE_INDICATORS:
-            if indicator in text:
-                out.append({"path": path, "match": _redact(indicator)})
-    return out[:50]
+            refs += [{"path": path, "match": _redact(m.group(0))} for m in pattern.finditer(text)]
+        refs += [{"path": path, "match": _redact(ind)} for ind in WRITE_INDICATORS if ind in text]
+    return refs[:50]
 
 
-def _extract_exposure(card: Any, manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    public = None
+def _exposure(manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str).lower()
-    if "public: true" in text or "public=true" in text:
-        public = True
-    if "public: false" in text or "public=false" in text:
-        public = False
+    public = True if "public: true" in text or "public=true" in text else False if "public: false" in text or "public=false" in text else None
     return {"public": public, "documented_public_reason": "public_reason" in text or "exposure_reason" in text, "unknown_when_null": public is None}
 
 
-def _extract_resources(card: Any, manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+def _resources(card: Any, manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     runtime = card.get("runtime") if isinstance(card, dict) else {}
     resources = runtime.get("resources") if isinstance(runtime, dict) else {}
     out = dict(resources or {}) if isinstance(resources, dict) else {}
     if "max_runtime_seconds" not in out:
-        text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str)
-        match = re.search(r"max_runtime_seconds[\s:=]+([0-9]+)", text)
+        match = re.search(r"max_runtime_seconds[\s:=]+([0-9]+)", json.dumps(manifests, default=str))
         out["max_runtime_seconds"] = int(match.group(1)) if match else "unknown"
     return out
 
 
-def _extract_provenance(manifests: dict[str, Any], files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+def _provenance(manifests: dict[str, Any], files: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     dockerfile = files.get("Dockerfile", "")
-    digest_pinned = "@sha256:" in dockerfile
-    return {"dockerfile_present": bool(dockerfile), "digest_pinned_base_image": digest_pinned if dockerfile else "unknown", "source_hashes": {k: v.get("sha256") for k, v in manifests.items() if isinstance(v, dict) and v.get("sha256")}}
+    return {"dockerfile_present": bool(dockerfile), "digest_pinned_base_image": ("@sha256:" in dockerfile) if dockerfile else "unknown", "source_hashes": {k: v.get("sha256") for k, v in manifests.items() if isinstance(v, dict) and v.get("sha256")}}
 
 
-def _extract_rbac(manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
+def _rbac(manifests: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
     text = json.dumps(manifests, default=str).lower()
     return {"service_account_mentions": text.count("serviceaccount"), "cluster_role_mentions": text.count("clusterrole"), "status": "observed" if "role" in text else "unknown"}
 
 
 def _unknowns(card: dict[str, Any], manifests: dict[str, Any], health: dict[str, Any], files: dict[str, str]) -> list[str]:
-    out: list[str] = []
+    out = []
     if not card.get("card"):
         out.append("agent_card")
     if not files:
@@ -754,22 +554,8 @@ def _unknowns(card: dict[str, Any], manifests: dict[str, Any], health: dict[str,
     return out
 
 
-def _controls_catalog() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    return [
-        {"control_id": "A2A-CARD-001", "title": "Agent Card availability and integrity"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-SCHEMA-001", "title": "Public skill inventory"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-SCHEMA-002", "title": "Strict non-null schemas"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-NET-001", "title": "Network exposure minimization"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-OPS-001", "title": "Runtime resource limits"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-SECRET-001", "title": "Secret handling and redaction"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "title": "Untrusted content isolation"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-TENANT-001", "title": "Tenant and namespace isolation"},
-        {"control_id": "A2A-HEALTH-001", "title": "Deployment health"},
-    ]
-
-
-def _schema_strict(schema: Any) -> bool:
-    return isinstance(schema, dict) and schema.get("type") == "object" and schema.get("additionalProperties") is False and bool(schema.get("properties"))
+def _controls() -> list[dict[str, str]]:
+    return [{"control_id": cid, "title": title} for cid, title in [("A2A-CARD-001", "Agent Card availability and integrity"), ("A2A-SCHEMA-001", "Public skill inventory"), ("A2A-SCHEMA-002", "Strict non-null schemas"), ("A2A-NET-001", "Network exposure minimization"), ("A2A-OPS-001", "Runtime resource limits"), ("A2A-SECRET-001", "Secret handling and redaction"), ("A2A-UNTRUSTED-001", "Untrusted content isolation"), ("A2A-TENANT-001", "Tenant and namespace isolation"), ("A2A-HEALTH-001", "Deployment health")]]
 
 
 def _repo_evidence(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[Evidence]:
@@ -778,52 +564,25 @@ def _repo_evidence(files: dict[str, str]) -> list[Evidence]:
 
 def _evidence(eid: str, source: str, status: Literal["observed", "missing", "unknown", "not_tested", "redacted"], payload: Any, path: str | None = None) -> Evidence:
     text = payload if isinstance(payload, str) else json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, default=str)
-    redacted = _redact(text)[:MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES]
-    return Evidence(id=eid, source=source, path=path, status=status, excerpt=redacted, sha256=_sha(text))
+    return Evidence(id=eid, source=source, path=path, status=status, excerpt=_redact(text)[:MAX_EVIDENCE_BYTES], sha256=_sha(text))
 
 
 def _audit_id(target: AuditTarget, supplied: str | None) -> str:
-    if supplied:
-        return supplied
-    digest = hashlib.sha256(f"{target.agent_name}|{target.repository or ''}|{int(time.time())}".encode()).hexdigest()[:12]
-    return f"audit-{target.agent_name}-{digest}"
+    return supplied or f"audit-{target.agent_name}-{hashlib.sha256(f'{target.agent_name}|{target.repository or ""}|{int(time.time())}'.encode()).hexdigest()[:12]}"
 
 
 def _output_dir(audit_id: str) -> str:
-    clean = re.sub(r"[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]", "-", audit_id)[:80]
-    return f"outputs/compliance/{clean}"
+    return f"outputs/compliance/{re.sub(r'[^A-Za-z0-9_.-]', '-', audit_id)[:80]}"
 
 
-def _repo_path_allowed(path: str) -> bool:
+def _path_allowed(path: str) -> bool:
     clean = path.replace("\\", "/").lstrip("/")
-    if ".." in clean.split("/"):
-        return False
-    if any(fnmatch(clean, pat) for pat in DENIED_REPO_GLOBS):
-        return False
-    return any(fnmatch(clean, pat) for pat in ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS)
+    return ".." not in clean.split("/") and not any(fnmatch(clean, p) for p in DENIED_REPO_GLOBS) and any(fnmatch(clean, p) for p in ALLOWED_REPO_GLOBS)
 
 
-def _allowed_hosts(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, options: AuditOptions) -> set[str]:
-    return {h.lower().strip() for h in [*agent.config.default_allowed_hosts, *options.allowed_hosts] if h.strip()}
-
-
-def _allowed_namespaces(agent: AgentComplianceAuditor, options: AuditOptions) -> set[str]:
-    return {n.strip() for n in [*agent.config.default_allowed_namespaces, *options.allowed_namespaces] if n.strip()}
-
-
-def _namespace_allowed(namespace: str | None, allowed_namespaces: set[str]) -> bool:
-    if not allowed_namespaces:
-        return True
-    return bool(namespace and namespace in allowed_namespaces)
-
-
-def _safe_http_url(parsed: Any, allowed_hosts: set[str]) -> bool:
-    if parsed.scheme not in {"https", "http"}:
-        return False
+def _safe_url(parsed: Any, allowed_hosts: set[str]) -> bool:
     host = (parsed.hostname or "").lower()
-    if not host or host in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"} or host.startswith("169.254.") or host.endswith(".local"):
-        return False
-    return host in allowed_hosts
+    return parsed.scheme in {"https", "http"} and bool(host) and host not in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "0.0.0.0"} and not host.startswith("169.254.") and not host.endswith(".local") and host in allowed_hosts
 
 
 def _bounded_json(text: str, warnings: list[str]) -> Any:
@@ -848,15 +607,12 @@ def _sha(text: str) -> str:
     return hashlib.sha256(text.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")).hexdigest()
 
 
-def _dump(model_or_value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(model_or_value, BaseModel):
-        return model_or_value.model_dump(mode="json")
-    return model_or_value
+def _dump(value: Any) -> Any:
+    return value.model_dump(mode="json") if isinstance(value, BaseModel) else value
 
 
 async def _event(ctx: RunContext[NoAuth], kind: str, **payload: Any) -> None:
-    safe_payload = json.loads(json.dumps(payload, default=str))
-    await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind=kind, payload=safe_payload))
+    safe = json.loads(json.dumps(payload, default=str))
+    await ctx.emit_event(AgentEvent(kind=kind, payload=safe))
     if kind in {"audit_started", "audit_progress", "audit_completed"}:
-        message = safe_payload.get("phase") or safe_payload.get("skill") or kind
-        await ctx.emit_progress(f"{kind}: {message}")
+        await ctx.emit_progress(f"{kind}: {safe.get('phase') or safe.get('skill') or kind}")